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The Budget Deficit and the Dollar
The dramatic surge in the dollar's value relative to major European cur-
rencies was probably the most important economic event of the period
between 1980 and 1984. The dollar's value rose from 1.8 German marks
in mid-1980 to a peak of more than 3.3 marks in February 1985. More
generally, the multilateral trade-weighted real value of the dollar rose by
70 percent between 1980 and the first quarter of 1985.
The rise of the dollar produced an unprecedented merchandise trade
deficit that increased to 3 percent of GNP by 1985, hurting a wide range
of American industries and creating a political receptivity to protection-
ism that still threatens to reverse the progress of the past half-century in
liberalizing world trade. The trade deficit and the associated current ac-
count deficit transformed the United States from a net capital exporter in
1980 to a country that by 1984 had a large enough capital inflow to fi-
nance 55 percent of the nation's total net fixed investment. In addition,
the sharp rise in the dollar not only increased Americans' real incomes
but also contributed significantly to the decline of inflation.'
In Europe and Japan, exports rose sharply and the current account
moved into substantial surplus; for the European Economic community
as a whole, the trade balance with the rest of the world improved by
more than $50 billion between 1980 and 1984. But at the same time, the
rise in the dollar induced foreign central banks to increase their interest
rates in order to prevent their currencies from faffing even further.2 On
balance, despite the increase in exports, the induced rise in interest rates
may have depressed aggregate demand in Europe by enough to make
the dollar's rise a net contributor to the stubbornly high level of un-
employment.
1. On the impact of the dollar's rise on U.S. inflation, see Sachs (1985)andSinai (1985).
2. This idea of an induced monetary policy response is discussed in Feldstein (1985,
1986a). This provides an alternative to the Blanchard and Summers (1985) explanation of
the high level of world interest rates.356 FELDSTEIN
The present study focuses on the real exchange rate between the dollar
and the German mark from the beginning of the floating exchange rate
regime in 1973 through 1984. The mark is not only very important in its
own right but is representative of the exchange rate between the dollar
and the other European countries, since the mark is the dominant cur-
rency in the European Monetary System.
7. Alternative Explanations of the Dollar's Rise
The basic cause of the dollar's sharp increase still remains a very conten-
tious subject. I have argued since 1982 that the dollar's rise could be
traced primarily to the increase in current and expected structural defi-
cits in the federal budget and to the shift to an anti-inflationary mone-
tary policy.3 This view was also elaborated in the Economic Reports of the
President for 1983 and1984.
Increases in the federal budget deficit raise real long-term interest
rates and these higher rates attract funds to the United States. The dol-
lar's rise is necessary to create the trade deficit and associated current
account deficit that permits the desired net inflow of foreign capital.
Moreover, to achieve portfolio equilibrium, the dollar must rise by
enough so that its expected future fall just offsets the nominal yield dif-
ferential between dollar securities and foreign assets. This is discussed
in Branson (1985) and Frenkel and Razin (1984). The budget deficit may
also raise the dollar more directly by changing the relative demand for
U.S. and foreign goods (Dorribusch 1983, Obstfeld 1985).
The effect on the dollar of the rising level of structural budget deficits
was reinforced by the change in monetary policy that began in October
1979. The contractionary shift of Federal Reserve policy caused a short-
term spike in real interest rates that temporarily increased the attractive-
ness of dollar securities. More fundamentally, the new Federal Reserve
policy also caused a more sustained increase in the confidence of inves-
tors worldwide that the value of the dollar would not soon be eroded by
a return to rising inflation in the United States. This reduction in the risk
of dollar investments reinforced the attractiveness caused by the deficit-
induced rise in the expected real interest rate.
Other economists and policy officials have offered quite different ex-
planations of the rise in the dollar. The Economic Report of the President for
1985 condudes that the most important reason for the rise in the dollar
between 1980 and 1982 was the rise in the after-tax return on new busi-
3.See, e.g., Feldsteui (1983).The Budget Deficit357
ness investment caused by the combination of the Economic Recovery
and Tax Act of 1981 and the reduced rate of inflation. The tight money
policy is also seen as a cause of the dollar's rise in this period. But the
authors conclude that although expanding budget deficits in this period
"may also have raised the level of U.S. real interest rates and helped to
strengthen the dollar. ..theextent of upward pressure on real interest
rates and on the dollar through this channel is uncertain, and numerous
studies have failed to uncover significant effects" (p. 105).
The report's authors also note that after 1982 the differential between
U.S. three-month real interest rates and a trade-weighted average of
three-month real interest rates in six other indusflial countries (calcu-
lated using OECD inflation forecasts) narrows to zero and is occasionally
negative. They conclude from this that "other factors have continued to
push up the demand for dollar assets" and suggest that the dollar's
strength since 1982 has been due to "the combination of increased after-
tax profitability of U.S. corporations, demonstrated strength of the U.S.
recovery, reversal of international lending outflow from U.S. banks,
and generally more favorable longer run prospects for the U.S. econ-
omy. ..."(pp.105—6).
Another commonly expressed opinion is that the rise in the dollar
since the summer of 1980 reflected growing confidence in the United
States as a "safe haven" for investments by foreigners who believed that
the election of Ronald Reagan would make their assets safer in the
United States than elsewhere in the world. There is also the view, identi-
fied most strongly with Ronald McKinnon (e.g., 1984), that the strong
dollar does not reflect any "real" phenomena (budget deficits, increased
profitability, alternative tax rules) but is solely an indication that mone-
tary policy in the United States is too tight.
At a more fundamental level, any role for the budget deficit in explain-
ing the rise of the dollar must be rejected by those economists who be-
lieve that deficits do not raise real interest rates because they induce an
equal offsetting rise in private saving (e.g., Barro 1974). Evans (1986) ex-
tended the procedure of Plosser (1982) to study the relation between un-
expected changes in budget deficits and the dollar and concluded the
dollar exchange rate is not affected by changes in the budget deficit. I
return below to the deficiencies of this type of analysis.
Although there may be some element of truth in each of the alternative
explanations of the dollar's rise, my own judgment is that they are not as
important as the increase in expected structural budget deficits and the
shift to a less inflationary monetary strategy. This is supported by the
econometric evidence presented in sections 4 through 6. The estimated358' FELDSTEIN
effects of the expected deficits and of the rate of growth of the money
supply are economically important and statistically significant. In con-
trast, the increase in profitability induced by the tax changes in the first
half of the 1980s did not have a significant effect on the exchange rate in
the equations presented below. The strong statistical evidence of a link
between the expected structural budget deficits and the value of the dol-
lar is direct evidence against the Barro hypothesis that budget deficits
have no real impact. The implied impact of the expected budget defi-
cits also contradicts the McKinnon hypothesis that the rise of the dollar
was due only to a tight monetary policy.
Before I turn to that econometric evidence, I think it will be useful to
consider some further reasons for rejecting the arguments of those who
claim that neither increased real interest rates nor budget deficits was
responsible for the dollar's rise.
The evidence presented in the 1985 Economic Report of the President (and
elsewhere) that there is no longer a difference between the three-month
real interest rate in the United States and in other industrial countries is
essentially irrelevant since the theory implies that the equilibrium rela-
tion between the exchange rate and the difference in long-term real rates
is much larger than the relation with the difference in short-term real
rates. It is easy to see why this is true. Consider the situation in which
the U.S. three-month real rate is four percentage points above the three-
month rate on foreign securities but there is no interest differential for
intervals beginning after three months. Thus the six-month interest rates
differ by only two percentage points, the one-year rates differ by one per-
centage point, and so on. The value of the dollar can be one percentage
point above its equilibrium value since the interest rate differential is
enough to compensate for a one percent decline in the dollar, regardless
of whether this happens in three months, six months, a year, or longer.
But with the differential in real rates concentrated only in the three-
month maturity, any greater overvaluation of the dollar would imply an
expected future decline not compensated by the difference in interest
rates.
In contrast, consider the situation in which the real interest rate on the
U.S. 10-year bond is 4 percentage points above the real yield on foreign
10-year bonds with no interest differential for intervals after ten years.
Then the real value of the dollar can fall by 4 percent a year for ten years
and still leave an investor indifferent between having purchased dollar
bonds and foreign bonds. This implies that a 4 percent real interest dif-
ferential on 10-year bonds can support a 48 percent initial overvaluation
of the dollar.The Budget Deficit359
It is noteworthy therefore that, although the three-month real yield dif-
ferential reached zero by the end of 1982 and hovered around that level
thereafter, the long-term real interest differential at the end of 1983 was
in the range of two to four percentage points, depending on the method
of forecasting future inflation.4 The observed real interest differential
was therefore quite consistent with the observed rise in the dollar's real
value. I will return later to the more formal evidence on the link between
the dollar and the real interest differential.
While the change in U.S. monetary policy after October 1979 may have
reduced the inflation risk in U.S. fixed-income securities, the notion that
the dollar rose in the 1980s because the United States capital market is a
political safe haven for foreign funds seems doubtful. Although the
United States does offer a politically safe environment, it is hard to see a
rise in U.S. political stability vis-à-vis Switzerland or other major coun-
tries between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Moreover, if there had
been a shift in the worldwide portfolio demand in favor of U.S. assets,
U.S. interest rates would have declined. The sharp rise in real rates sug-
gests that any "safe haven" increase in the demand for dollar assets was
overwhelmed by the increased supply of those assets. It is also doubtful
that the declines of 25 percent or more between February 1985 and Feb-
ruary 1986 in the value of the dollar relative to the German mark, the
Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen reflects any deterioration in the rela-
tive political stability and security of the United States.
Those who point to the reduced lending of U.S. banks to the Latin
American debtor nations after fall, 1982, as an example of the safe haven
effect misconstrue the portfolio effect of that lending. That change in
lending did not represent a change in U.S. demand for assets denomi-
nated in foreign currencies since those loans were all denominated in
dollars. Moreover, the loan proceeds were used by the borrowers either
to purchase imports or, through capital flight, to make deposits or pur-
chase assets in the United States.
There are two problems with the argument that the dollar rose because
the strength of the recovery attracted investments seeking to share in
U.S. profitability. First, the real value of the dollar rose through the reces-
sions of 1980 and 1981 and was 36 percent higher at the trough of the
second recession (in the final quarter of 1982) than it had been in 1980.
Real interest rates and projected budget deficits were rising during this
period even though the economy was sagging. Second, most of the capi-
tal inflow to the United States was in the form of bank deposits or pur-
4.This isshown on p. 52 of The Economic Report of the President for 1984.360 FELDSTEIN
chases of short-term fixed income securities and only about one-third
was in the form of portfolio equity purchases or direct investment. In
1982 and 1983 combined, there was a $192 billion increase in foreign pri-
vate assets in the United States but direct investments were only $27 bil-
lion and stock purchases were only $33 billion.
In short, there are good reasons to reject the arguments of those who
say that the dollar's rise cannot be due to higher real rates because the
interest differential disappeared long ago and who attribute the dollar's
rise to the attractiveness of U.S. financial markets as a safe haven for for-
eign investors and as a place in which equity investments can participate
in the profitable recovery. Although the improved tax climate for invest-
ment should in principle have raised the value of the dollar, the evi-
dence presented below indicates that this effect is too weak to discern
statistically.
The study by Evans (1986) is unpersuasive for quite a different reason.
Evans's basic procedure is to relate quarterly movements in the exchange
rate to the quarterly "surprises" in the deficit, in government spending,
in monetary policy, and the like. These "surprises" are calculated as the
residuals from vector autoregression predictions of the deficit and other
variables. The fundamental problem with this procedure is that it as-
sumes that the deficit variable that might influence the exchange rate is
the concurrent deficit, when theory implies that it is the sequence of ex-
pected future deficits that influences the long-term real interest rate and
the exchange rate.5 There is no reason for the surprises in actual current
quarterly deficits to be related to the expected future deficits.6
Finally, the evidence presented below supports the importance of the
increased budget deficits as the primary cause of the rise in the dollar
and thereby refutes both the Ricardian-equivalence proposition that
budget deficits have no real effects and the position of McKinnon and
others who attribute all of the dollar's rise to tight monetary policy in the
United States.
2.Studiesof the Dollar and the Interest Diffcrential
Except for the study by Evans (1986), the empirical research on the deter-
mination of exchange rates has focused on the relation between the
5.Theimportance of expected future deficits was emphasized in Feldstein (1983) and ana-
lyzed more formally in Frenkel and Razin (1984), Blanchard (1985), and Branson (1985).
6. The same criticism also applies to Plosser's (1982) claim that budget deficits do not influ-
ence the level of interest rates.The Budget Deficit '361
exchange rate and the real interest differential.7 Although the equilib-
rium relation between the exchange rate and the interest differential is a
fundamental characteristic of portfolio balance in foreign exchange mar-
kets (Dornbusch 1976, Frankel 1979), there are four serious problems in
estimating an equation relating the exchange rate to the real interest dif-
ferential in order to understand the causes of variations in the real ex-
change rate and, more specifically, to assess the role of the budget deficit
as a cause of changes in the exchange rate.
First, the critical interest rate variable is very difficult to measure with
any accuracy. The difference in real long-term interest rates is equal to
the difference in nominal long-term interest rates minus the difference in
expected long-term inflation rates. It is clearly very difficult to measure
with any accuracy the difference between the long-term expected infla-
tion rates in the two countries. These expectations depend not only on
the history of inflation in the two countries but also on the credibility of
government and central bank policies. The critical real interest differ-
ential is therefore subject to substantial measurement error that will tend
to bias the coefficient toward zero and to reduce the statistical signifi-
cance of its effect.8
Second, changes in the level of the real interest rate in each country
7. Although measures of the money stock, inflation, and real activity have sometimes been
included among the regressors, neither the budget deficit nor the effect of changes in tax
rules has been included. See Frankel (1979) for a relatively early study of this form and
Hooper (1985), Meese and Rogoff (1985) and Sachs (1985) for more recent examples;
Obstfeld (1985) provides a very useful survey of recent research on this subject. I-looper
allows budget deficits and tax rules to affect the exchange rate as part of a large econo-
metric model but the estimated effect is only through their impact on the real interest
differential. Moreover, since Hooper uses only the current budget deficit (rather than
expected future deficits) it is not surprising that he estimates only a relatively small
effect of the deficit on the exchange rate.
After this paper was written, I received a copy of Hutchinson and Throop (1985); the
authors provide a very careful analysis that shows that the trade-weighted real value of
the dollar can be explained by an equation that combines the real interest differential
between the United States and the seven major industrial countries and a corresponding
one-year expected structural budget deficit differential. Both the interest rate and the
deficit differential are significant in this formulation. They present no evidence about
monetary policy or tax policy.
8. A review of the papers that use a "real interest differential" to explain exchange rate
variations shows the potential seriousness of this problem. For example, Frankel's 1979
paper used the short-term German-U.S. interest differential instead of the long-terni dif-
ferential and measured the difference in expected. long-term inflation rates (a separate
variable in his formulation) by the difference in long-term bond rates. Meese and Rogoff
(1985), in an otherwise very sophisticated paper, also generally use the three-month in-
terest rates; when they do use long-term bonds, they take inflation during the most re-
cent twelve months as a proxy for long-term expected inflation. Hooper's analysis is
perhaps most satisfactory but uses only a three-year moving average of inflation rates.362 FELDSTEIN
reflect changes in the risk premium required to get investors to hold the
debt denominated in that currency. These changes reflect variations in
the perceived risk of fluctuations in the interest rate and the exchange
rate as well as variations in the relative quantities of the assets denomi-
nated in that currency. An increase in the level of the real interest rate
from a change in the.risk premium can occur with no change in the ex-
change rate.
Third, the real interest rates in the two countries are endogenous vari-
ables, responding to changes in the exchange rate in a way that causes
the direct structural effect of the interest rates on the exchange rate to be
underestimated. Thus, a strong dollar implies a reduction in net exports,
which depresses aggregate demand in the United States and therefore
tends to lower the U.S. real interest rate. In addition, the strong dollar
reduces U.S. net exports, thereby increasing the net capital inflow to the
United States; the increase in the current and projected net capital inflow
also tends to lower U.S. real interest rates. The stronger dollar may at
times induce a more lax monetary policy than would otherwise prevail,
temporarily reducing the real interest rate. These inverse effects of the
dollar on the level of interest rates attenuates the measured direct effect
of the interest rate on the level of the dollar.
An increase in the dollar-DM rate also tends to raise the real interest
rate in Germany through the same three channels that cause it to lower
the real interest rate in the United States. The weaker mark increases eco-
nomic activity in Germany and this raises the real interest rate. The cur-
rent and projected outflow of capital from Germany that accompanies
the trade surplus raises the equilibrium real interest rate. And recent ex-
perience indicates that a fear of the inflationary consequences of a declin-
ing mark caused the Bundesbank to tighten monetary policy as the mark
fell relative to the dollar.9
In the econometric estimates of the relation between the exchange rate
and the interest rate presented in section 6, 1 use an instrumental vari-
ables procedure that treats the interest differential as endogertous. The
instrumental variables are the budget deficits of the two càuntries, the
past growth of the monetary base, and the past rates of inflation. The use
of the instrumental variable procedure may also reduce the bias that re-
suits from the difficulty of measuring expected inflation. However, de-
spite its desirable large-sample properties, the instrumental variable
procedure is of only limited comfort with the small sample available in
the present study.
9. On the induced change in Bundesbank policy, see Feldstein (1986a) and Feldstein and
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Inaddition to the statistical problems of estimating the direct effect of
exogenous shifts in the real interest differential on the exchange rate,
there is the more fundamental issue that evidence on the dollar's re-
sponse to changes in the real interest rate does not resolve the issue of
the relative importance of changes in the budget deficit, in tax policy,
and in monetary policy. Although that could in principle be obtained by
estimating a separate equation relating the real interest rate to the budget
deficit, tax, and monetary variables,'0 that two-equation specification
implicitly assumes that these variables affect the. exchange rate only
through the real interest differential. At a minimum,changesin mone-
tary, tax, and budget policies may affect the expected rate of inflation
and the uncertainty about future real interest rates in ways that are not
captured by the measured values of the real interest rates. In addition, as
Dornbusch (1983) has noted, the budget deficit can have a direct effect
through the relative demand for domestic and foreign goods.
This article therefore focuses on estimating a reduced-form specifica-
tion that relates the dollar-DM exchange rate to four key variables: ex-
pected future budget deficits; tax-induced changes in the profitability of
investment in plant and equipment; past inflation; and changes in mone-
tary policy. The specification is also extended to include other variables
such as the net U.S. stocks of international investment and the rate of
growth of real GNP. A dummy variable is also used to evaluate whether
the dollar's exchange value was higher in the period 1980—84 for some
other unmeasured reason such as an increased attractiveness of the
United States as a "safe haven" for foreign funds or international inves-
tors' greater faith in the Reagan administration. In addition to these
reduced-form equations, the paper also reports estimates of equations
relating the dollar-DM exchange rate to a measure of the real interest rate
differential, using an instrumental variable procedure to reduce the sta-
tistical bias that might otherwise result from the endogeneity of the in-
terest rates and the errors of measurement.
The next section describes these key variables and their construction
in more detail. The estimated equations are then discussed and pre-
sented in sections 4 and 5.
3. The Key Variables of a Reduced-Form Specification
The dependent variable of the equations presented below is the real ex-
change rate between the dollar and the German mark calculated as the
nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the GNP deflators. The
10. This is done in Feldstein (1986b).364 FELDSTEIN
exchange rate is stated as the number of German marks per U.S. dollar; a
rise of the dependent variable is thus a rise in the real value of the dollar.
The key variables of the reduced-form specification described above
cannot be observed directly but must be constructed. Here I describe the
rationale for these variables and the way that they have been constructed
for the current study. The regression equations reported later are esti-
mated with annual observations for the period 1973 through 1984. The
analysis uses annual observations because quarterly or monthly observa-
tions on variables like the expected future budget deficits and the tax-
induced changes in profitability would probably contain much more
measurement error with little or no increase in actual information.
3.1. EXPECTED U.S. BUDGETDEFICITS
It is the path of expected future budget deficits rather than simply the
current year's deficit that influences the level of real interest rates and the
exchange rate. In 1983 testimony (Feldstein 1983) I emphasized this link
of the exchange rate to expected future budget deficits as follows:
That is the essential explanation of the strong dollar: the high real long-term in-
terest rate in the United States, combined with the sense that dollar investments
are relatively safe and that American inflation will remain low, induces investors
worldwide to shift in favor of dollar securities. Moreover, the unusually high real
long-term interest rate here relative to the real rates abroad is now due primarily
to the low projected national savings rate caused by the large projected budget
deficits (emphasis addedi.
To clarify the importance of the long-term projected deficits rather
than just the current year's deficit, I noted:
Net national saving fell from its customary 7 percent of GNP to only 1.5 percent
of GNP in 1982 and 1.5 percent of GNP in the first three quarters of 1983.
Moreover, and of particular importance in this context, the large budget deficits
that are projected for the next five years and beyond if no legislative action is
taken means that our net national saving rate will continue to remain far below
the previous level.
If government borrowing is high for only a single year, the additional
government debt can be absorbed by temporarily displacing private in-
vestment with little effect on long-term interest rates. In contrast, the
expected persistence of budget deficits in the future implies a larger in-
crease in the stock of debt that must be sold to the private sector and a
persistent displacement of private investment that must be achieved toThe Budget Deficit365
accommodate the government's borrowing. Future budget deficits also
mean future increases in potential aggregate demand that will lead to
higher future short-term interest rates and therefore to higher current
long-term rates. All of these considerations imply that the dollar ex-
change rate should be more sensitive to expected future deficits rather
than to the current year's budget deficit.
Blanchard (1985) emphasized the importance of expected future defi-
cits in the determination of current long-term interest rates and Frenkel
and Razin (1984, 1986) and Branson (1985) emphasized the importance
of expected future deficits in exchange rate determination.
The expected persistence of structural budget deficits also increases
the risk that political pressures will lead to an inflationary monetary
policy. To this extent, expected high future deficits may raise nominal
interest rates but reduce the exchange value of the dollar by making
dollar-denominated fixed income securities more risky.
Neither of the studies that explicitly looks at budget deficits considers
the expected sequence of future budget deficits. I have already com-
mented on the fact that Evans's (1986) procedure is based on the differ-
ence between the budget deficit in the current quarter and the deficit
predicted by a VAR equation for the current quarter. There is no atten-
tion to expected future deficits. Hooper's (1985) analysis is also in terms
of the current quarter's budget deficit with no attention to expected fu-
ture deficits. As a result, I am not inclined to give any weight to Evans's
negative conclusion or to Hooper's condusion that budget deficits had
only a small effect on the dollar exchange rate.
The variable used in this study to represent the anticipated future
budget deficit (DEFEX) is an estimate of the average ratio of the budget
deficit to GNP for five future years. Since the five-year deficit forecast is
used as a proxy for the long-term expected deficit, it is appropriate to
eliminate the cyclical component of the deficit and focus on the struc-
tural component of the deficit relative to an estimate of potential or full-
employment GNP. The structural deficit is calculated from the observed
or projected deficit and an estimate of the difference between the actual
GNP and potential GNP. The details of this calculations and of the deri-
vation of potential GNP are des9ribed in Feldstein (1986b).
Although five-year forecasts of the deficit and of GNP have been made
in recent years, they are not available for the entire sample period. The
analysis therefore assumes that, for the years for which it is observable,
the actual deficit and the actual GNP are the best estimates of the values
that financial market participants previously anticipated. For the years
1985 and beyond, the expected deficit and expected GNP are measured
by the projections published in July 1985 by Data Resources, Inc. TheFELDSTEIN
Data Resources deficit projections reflect anticipated policy develop-
ments as well as existing tax and spending rules; they are therefore taken
as an indication of the view of sophisticated financial market partici-
pants. The actual and projected deficits are then adjusted to obtain
structural deficits and full-employment GNP. Note that this implies that
for recent years the expected deficit variable is a combination of actual
deficits and projected deficits; e.g., the 1983 expected future deficit vari-
able includes the observed deficit and GNP variables for 1983 and 1984
but the DRI projections for 1985 through 1987.
The anticipated deficit variable has been constructed in a way that, as
far as possible, avoids discretionary decisions in order to eliminate any
suspicion that the deficit variable has been modified to obtain a variable
that can explain the variations in the exchange rate. Avoiding discretion
can, however, lead to implausible assumptions and several people com-
menting on an earlier draft of this article said that they were concerned
about the implication that the financial markets anticipated the unprece-
dented growth of budget deficits in the 1980s even before the 1980 elec-
tion of Ronald Reagan and the presentation of his 1981 budget.
I have therefore constructed an alternative expected deficit variable
that differs from the standard expected deficit variable for the years 1977
through 1980. For those years, the alternative expected five-year average
deficit ratio is calculated by assuming that the 1980 ratio of structural
deficit to GNP persists. For example, the average for 1978 con-
sists of an average of the deficit-GNP ratios for 1978, 1979, and 1980
with 1980 getting 60 percent of the weight. This variable will be denoted
DEFALT (alternative deficit variable). The empirical analysis shows that
substituting this for my standard expected deficit variable improves the
explanatory power of the equation but does not alter the estimated
coefficient.
3.2. EXPECTED GERMAN BUDGET DEFICITS
Although the exchange rate between the dollar and the German mark
might at first seem to depend symmetrically on the budget deficits of the
United States and Germany, this is true only if the two countries are
symmetric in all other relevant ways. There are, however, two major dif-
ferences between the United States and Germany that imply that changes
in German deficits have smaller effects on the exchange rate than changes
U.S. deficits.
First, the German economy is less than one-third the size of the U.S.
economy. An increase in the German deficit by 1 percent of GNP is
therefore only one-third as large as 1 percent U.S. GNP deficit increase.
More important, the close links among the European economies, nowThe Budget Deficit -367
formalized by the European Monetary System, means that European in-
vestors will frequently act as if exchange rates among the major Euro-
pean countries are fixed. To the extent that this is true, what matters is
not the change in the German budget deficit as a percentage of German
GNP but the change in the combined European (or EMS) budget deficits
as a percentage of the combined GNPs of those countries. Although this
idea will be the subject of further attention in a future study, the current
article uses only the ratio of the German budget deficit to German GNP.
The German expected deflcit-GNP ratio variable (DEFEXG) is con-
structed to be as close as possible in concept to the U.S. expected deficit
variable, although differences inevitably remain. The basic source of the
data is an OECD study of structural budget deficits (Price and Muller
1984) that provides estimates of the ratio of the structural budget deficit
to potential GNP for each year from 1973 through 1984. Forecasts for
1985 and 1986 are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook for De-
cember 1985. For the years through 1982, these data can be used to con-
struct a five-year average by assuming that financial markets expected
the deficit-GNP ratios that were subsequently observed (or, for 1985 and
1986, that were subsequently forecast by the OECD). For 1983 and 1984,
we lack the necessary forecasts of the deflcit-GNP ratio in the more dis-
tant future; we therefore assume that investors project the deficit-GNP
ratio at the 1984 level.
It should be noted that there is a serious problem in defining the struc-
tural deficit for Germany since the German unemployment rate (defined
to approximate U.S. standards) rose from less than 1 percent in 1973 to
nearly 8 percent in 1984. There is substantial controversy about how
much of this increase is cyclical and how much is structural. Although
the present analysis adopts the deficit implicit in the OECD measure of
the structural deficit, it is clear that there is substantial possible error in
this variable.
3.3. TAX-INDUCED CHANGES IN PROFiTABILITY
The after-tax profitability of new corporate investments in plant and
equipment determines the corporate demand for funds. If the domestic
supply of funds to the corporate sector is relatively inelastic, an increase
in the corporate demand for funds will put upward pressure on real in-
terest rates and attract an inflow of capital from abroad. In contrast, if
the corporate sector is a relatively small part of the domestic capital mar-
ket, an increase in the corporate demand for funds can probably be satis-
fied without a significant rise in the real rate of return and therefore with
little effect on international capital flows and the dollar.
The difference between pretax and after-tax profitability depends on368• FELDSTEIN
the corporate tax rate, the depreciation rules, the investment tax credit,
and the rate of inflation. All of this can be summarized by the "maximum
potential real net return" (MPRNR) that the firm can afford to pay to the
suppliers of capital on a standard project.u In an economy without
taxes, the MPRNR on a project would be the traditional real internal rate
of return. With taxes and complex tax depreciation rules, the MPRNR is
the maximum real return that the firm can afford to pay on the outstand-
ing "loan" (of debt or equity or a combination of the two) used to finance
the project and have fully repaid the "loan" when the project is exhausted.
The standard project for which this calculation is done is a "sandwich"
of equipment and structures in a ratio that matches the actual equipment-
structures mix of the nonresidential capital stock. Because the tax law
specifies depreciation rules and interest deductibility in nominal terms,
the expected real net return depends on the expected rate of inflation; a
maximum potential nominal return is obtained using an expected infla-
tion series generated by a "rolling" ARIMA forecast (described below)
and then the real MPRNR is calculated by subtracting the average ex-
pected inflation rate from this maximum potential nominal return. Full
details of the calculation are provided in Feldstein and Jun (1986) in
which it is also shown that variations in the MPRNR have had a substan-
tial effect on corporate investment in the past quarter-century.
The MPRNR represents a potential net return that the firm can provide
in the sense that it takes into account the deductibility of interest pay-
ments. From the portfolio investor's point of view, what matters is not the
MPRNR but the maximum market rate of return that the corporation can
provide. This differs from the MPRNR essentially in the fact that the
portfolio investor receives gross interest while the MPRNR reflects inter-
est net of the corporate deduction for that interest cost. The maximum
real return depends on the mix of debt and equity that the firm uses to
raise marginal increments to its capital stock. If we assume an average
ratio of two-thirds equity and one-third debt and incorporate the average
historical standard difference in the net returns of equity and debt, we
can calculate "the maximum potential real interest return" (MPRIR).'2
The MPRNR measure of real net profitability remained at approxi-
mately 6.0 percent during the years 1973 through 1984 and then rose
to approximately 7.3 percent in the early 1980s. The behavior of the
ii. This M1'RNR measure is very closely related to the MPNR and MPIR values calculated
in Feldstein and Summers (1978) and updated with some improvements in Feldstein
and Jun (1986).
22. See Feldstein (1986b) for an explanation of how the related nominal MPIR is calculated.
The MPRIR is obtained from the MPIR by substracting the same average projected in-
flation rate used to generate the MPNJR and MPIR values.The Budget Deficit369
maximum potential real interest rate was quite different. Since nominal
interest rates are deductible in calculating the taxable profits of the cor-
poration, a one percentage point decline in expected inflation reduces
the maximum potential nominal interest rate by more than one percent-
age point and therefore reduces the maximum potential real interest
rate. The MPRIR measure of the maximum real net interest rate rose sig-
nificantly between 1973 and 1981 (because of the rising expected rate of
inflation) and then came down significantly in the 1980s. Both variables
are studied in the empirical section.
3.4. EXPECTED INFLATION
The expected inflation rate has no direct role in a simple model of
exchange-rate determination since the exchange rate depends only on
the difference in real rates. However, as Frankel (1979) has emphasized,
a rise in expected inflation may temporarily depress real interest rates
(because nominal rates do not adjust rapidly enough) and therefore the
exchange rate. In addition, financial investors may regard a higher infla-
tion rate as inherently more uncertain; a government that has allowed its
inflation rate to get to (say) 10 percent may be less able to control it in the
future than a government that has kept its inflation rate under 5 per-
cent. The uncertainty of future inflation makes the future value of the
currency more uncertain and therefore depresses the demand for the
currency.
The expected rate of inflation is not only unobservable but depends on
a large number of variables: past rates of inflation; past increases in
monetary aggregates; projected structural budget deficits; changes in
energy prices; the current level of capacity utilization; etc. Although it is
not possible to combine all of these factors to obtain a single operational
measure of expected inflation, the exchange-rate equations presented
below include many of these variables. The proper interpretation of the
projected structural budget deficit variable, for example, is therefore a
combination of the direct effect of the deficit on real interest rates and
any effect that operates through expected inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty. It is not possible to identify these separate effects but only to
quantify the net impact of expected deficits on the exchange rate.
Although this approach is satisfactory as a general way of dealing with
the effect of expected inflation on the dollar's value, it cannot be used for
quantifying the effect of the tax-inflation interaction on the maximum
potential real interest rate. For that purpose, we require an explicit year-
by-year forecast of inflation over the future life of the standard invest-
ment project. To do that, we estimate a series of first-order ARIMA
models using quarterly data on the GNP deflator with observations370 FELDSTEIN
through each year and use these models to forecast future inflation rates
for the 30-year life of the standard investment project. The algorithm cal-
culates nominal values of MPNR and MPIR using the entire set of thirty
years of inflation rates. These nominal returns are then converted into
real returns by subtracting a weighted average of the projected future
inflation rates.
This "projected inflation variable" (INFEX) is also used as a separate
explanatory variable in the exchange-rate regressions to summarize the
past rates of inflation. As an alternative, equations are also presented
with a polynomial distributed lag on past rates of change of the GNP
deflator. -
3.5.OTHER VARIABLES
The other variables that are included in some or all of the estimated
exchange-rate equations can be easily described.
The basis measure of U.S. monetary policy in this study is the rate
of change of the monetary. base (MBGRO). As an alternative, equations
are also estimated with the rate of change of Ml (M1GRO). Variables
such as the ratio of money to GNP or the interest rate would clearly
be endogenous in a way that would be inappropriate for the current
specification.
For Germany, equations are presented with the rate of change of the
Central Bank money stock (MBGROG). There is, however, a problem of
interpreting this variable if, as I believe, the Bundesbank altered the
growth of its monetary base in response to variations in the dollar-DM
ratio. A strong dollar and declining mark created potential inflationary
pressures that caused the Bundesbank to reduce the growth of the mone-
tary base, thereby introducing an offsetting negative correlation between
the growth,of the German monetary base and the strength of the dollar.
Much of the financial market discussion of short-term changes in
exchange rates focuses on changes in the pace of economic activity, pre-
sumably as an indicator of future changes in real interest rates. Dorn-
busch (1983) and Obstfeld (1985) also show how changes in domestic
demand can alter the exchange rate by changing the relative demand for
domestic and foreign goods. The current analysis uses the change in real
GNP (GNPGRO) as a measure of economic activity.
Some of the equations also include a dummy variable for the period
beginning in 1980 (DUM8O+) to see whether the effects attributed to the
rising budget deficit are due simply to some other unidentified or un-
measured character of the period since 1980, such as the altered nature
of monetary policy or the strengthened political "safe haven" quality of
the dollar.The Budget Deficit. 371
Finally,some of the equations include the net international investment
position (NIIP) of the United States, i.e., the excess of U.S. investments
abroad over foreign investments in the United States. If U.S. securities
are not a perfect substitute for foreign securities, an exogenous increase
in the net international investment position of the United States should
strengthen the dollar by reducing the demand for additional foreign se-
curities by U.S. investors. Similarly, an exogenous rise in the foreign
holding of U.S. securities (a decrease in the U.S. net international invest-
ment position) should reduce the value of the dollar by reducing the de-
mand for dollar securities.
Since the NIIP of the United States reflects past current account defi-
cits, the level of the NIIP will not be exogenous if the residual in the cur-
rent account equation or in the equation for the exchange rate is serially
correlated. For example, an increased taste for investing in dollar se-
curities will strengthen both the dollar and, after a lag, reduce the U.S.
net international investment position. Since the taste shift is unobserv-
able, the coefficient of the NIIP of the United States will be biased down-
ward toward zero. Although it would be desirable to develop a more
complete analysis of this issue with which to model the process of port-
folio satiation, the current research settles for only a very simple exten-
sion of the basic specification to include the NIIP variable.
4. A Summary of the Reduced-Form Estimates
It is useful to begin with a summary of the estimated reduced-form equa-
tions and a commentary on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
The individual estimated equations are presented and discussed in sec-
tion 5. The equations relating the exchange rate to real expected interest
rates in the United States and Germany are discussed in section 6.
The dependent variable of all of the estimated equations is the real
dollar-DM exchange rate, defined as the number of German marks per
dollar, adjusted for the level of the GNP deflator of the two countries and
normalized to 1.0 in 1980. This variable declined erratically from 1.21 in
1973 to 0.97 in 1979 and then dimbed to 1.72 in 1984. Individual annual
values are shown in appendix table A-i, together with the annual values
of all other variables used in this study.
The basic equation relates the real dollar-DM exchange rate to the ex-
pected structural deficits as a percentage of GNP (DEFEX), the maxi-
mum potential real interest rate that can be supported by a standard
investment project given the concurrent tax rules and expected inflation
(MPRIR), the rate of growth of the monetary base (MBGRO), and the
average future GNP inflation projected by a rolling ARIMA model372 FELDSTEIN
(INFEX). To test the sensitivity of the estimated effect of the expected
deficit variable to the specification of the exchange rate equation, a large
number of variants of this basic specification have been estimated. These
variations omit some of the basic variables, replacing the basic variables
with other closely related variables (e.g., replacing INFEX by a poly-
nomial distributed lag on past changes in the GNP deflator) and adding
additional variables.
Several results are very robust with respect to alternative specifica-
tions. The coefficient of the expected future budget deficits is always
positive, substantial, and almost always statistically significant. The
point estimate generally varies between 0.25 and 0.40. To appreciate the
magnitude of this coefficient, it is useful to recognize that DEFEX rose
from 1.58 (percent of GNP) in 1978 and 1.79 to 3.38 in 1983 and 3.33 in
1984. Comparing the average of the first two years with the average of the
last two years implies an increase of 1.67 percent of GNP. A coefficient of
0.25 implies an increase of the dollar-DM exchange rate index of 0.42
while a coefficient of 0.40 implies an increase of the dollar-DM index of
0.67. Since the dollar-DM index rose from 0.99 in 1978—79 to 1.61 in
1983—84, the rise in the expected budget deficit can account for between
two-thirds of the dollar's rise (0.42/0.62 =0.677)and slightly more than
100 percent of the dollar's rise (0.67/0.62 =1.08).
The coefficient of monetary base growth is always negative and gener-
ally statistically significant. A negative coefficient implies that a faster
growth of the monetary base depresses the value of the dollar. This may
be because an increase in the monetary base temporarily increases the
liquidity of the banking system and therefore reduces interest rates or,
more generally, because it causes nominal interest rates to decline. Alter-
natively, more rapid growth of the monetary base may raise expected in-
flation or inflation uncertainty, thereby making dollar securities more
risky.
The value of the coefficient of the annual growth rate of the monetary
base is approximately —0.06. Although the implied effect of monetary
policy can explain relatively little of the dollar's rise from 1980 to 1984, it
does indicate an important effect during the early part of the period. The
annual rate of growth of the monetary base fell from 8.8 percent in 1978
and 1979 to a low of 6.4 percent in 1981. The coefficient of 0.06 implies a
rise in the DM-dollar exchange rate index of 0.144 between these years.
Since the actual exchange rate index rose from 0.99 to 1.31, the tighter
money can account for nearly one-half of the observed rise (0.144/0.32 =
0.45)from 1978—79 to 1981. However, since the expected budget deficit
increased during the same years from 1.68 percent of GNP to 2.82 per-The Budget Deficit373
cent of GNP, the implied rise in the DM-dollar index was about twice as
large as the rise implied by the change in monetary policy and the two
together account for more than the entire rise, implying that other fac-
tors depressed the dollar's value during this period.
By 1984, the annual rate of increase of the monetary base was back up
to 8.1 percent, implying that the change since 1978—79 could only ex-
plain about 0.05 points of the 0.73 point rise in the real dollar-DM ratio.
The coefficient of the MPRIR tax variable was frequently insignificant
and generally had the wrong sign (implying that increases in the maxi-
mum potential real interest rate that resulted from changes in ex ante
effective tax rates depressed the value of the dollar). The coefficient of
the MPRNR variable also generally had the wrong sign but was almost
always insignificant. While a negative coefficient cannot be reconciled
with the theoretical expectations, the insignificant coefficients are con-
sistent with an earlier finding (Feldstein and Summers 1978) that shifts
in the MPIR had only a small effect on market interest rates, a result that
was obtained more recently (Feldstein 1986b) in an even stronger form.
The small and insignificant effect of the MPRIR and MPRNR on the fi-
nancial variables stands in sharp contrast to their powerful effects on
real investment reported in Feldstein (1982) and Feldstein and Jun (1986).
The insensitivity of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate to
the rate that corporate borrowers can afford to pay on a standard invest-
ment project may simply reflect the fact that corporate borrowers repre-
sent only a small part of the funds raised in credit markets. Between 1980
and 1984, corporate borrowing was only 20.5 percent of the total funds
raised in the credit markets by all of the public and private nonfinancial
borrowers combined. Even a substantial shift in the demand curve rep-
resented by this 20 percent need not cause an appreciable rise in the in-
terest rate if the additional funds are easily attracted from the other
borrowers, from potential savers, or from the rest of the world.
Negative coefficients of the M1'RIR and MPRNR variables cannot be
given a structural interpretation. They may represent the correlation of
this variable with other omitted variables that depress the value of the
dollar. While this leaves some residual doubt about the actual impact of
the tax changes, it is important to note that including, excluding, or
changing the specification of the tax variable does not alter the conclu-
sions about the expected budget deficit variables.
The inflation variables had a negative coefficient, implying that a
higher rate of predicted (or past) inflation depressed the relative value of
the dollar. This may reflect a failure of the nominal interest rate to adjust
quickly enough to changes in the expected rate of inflation. Alterna-374 FELDSTEIN
tively, if there is a positive correlation between the inflation level and in-
flation uncertainty, the higher level of predicted inflation may make the
dollar a riskier asset for investors and therefore an asset of lower value.
Although the inflation coefficient was always negative, the magnitude
of the coefficient varied substantially from one specification to another
and was not always statistically significant. In interpreting the coeffi-
cient, it should be borne in mind that INFEX rose from 6.7 percent in
1978—79 to 8.1 percent in 1981 and fell to 5.5 percent in 1984. A coeffi-
cient of —0.04onthis variable would imply a decline of 0.06 points on
the dollar-DM index between 1978—79 and 1981, followed by a rise of
0.10 points between 1981 and 1984. This increase represents about one-
fourth of the rise in the dollar-DM index during those years.
The estimated coefficients of the expected German budget deficits are
always insignificant. This may reflect the difficulty in measuring the Ger-
man structural deficit accurately or it may reflect the fact that the close
links among the European economies mean that the dollar-DM ratio is
not sensitive to German deficits per Se. Only future work will clarify
this. It is important to note, however, that the indusion or exclusion of
this variable has essentially no effect on the coefficient of the U.S. budget
deficit variable.
5. The Estimated Reduced Form Equations
Table 1 presents the basic reduced-form equation and a number of varia-
tions on this specification. In equation (1.1) the coefficient of the ex-
pected deficit variable (DEFEX) is 0.375 with a standard error of 0.071,
implying that each percentage point increase in the ratio of expected
structural deficit to GNP raises the real dollar-DM index by 0.375 points.
As noted above, the real dollar-DM index rose from 0.99 in 1978—79 to
1.72 in 1984 while the expected deficit rose from 1.68 percent of GNP to
3.35 percent of GNP. The coefficient of 0.375 implies that the rise in
DEFEX accounts for 63 points of the 73-point rise in the index.
The coefficient of the tax variable, the maximum potential real interest
rate (MPRIR) supportable by a standard project, has the wrong sign. I
will return later to this and to its sensitivity to specification.
The coefficient of the ARIMA inflation projection (INFEX) is negative
but is only —0.010 and much smaller than its standard error of 0.029. It is
useful to reiterate a point made earlier that this ARIMA variable should
not be regarded as equivalent to inflation expectations since inflation ex-
pectations at any time will also reflect the growth of the monetary base,



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, the rate of growth of the monetary base has a coefficient of
—0.06 (with a standard error of 0.042), implying that a faster rate of
monetary growth depresses the value of the dollar.
The adjusted R2 of 0.78 implies that the equation explains the varia-
tions in the dollar-DM ratio quite well and the Durbin-Watson statistic of
1.68 indicates that there is little serial correlation of the residuals.
Equation (1.2) replaces the basic DEFEX variable with the alternative
DEFALT variable (described in section 3.1) that was constructed to avoid
the assumption that financial market participants anticipated the large
budget deficits before 1981. The coefficient of DEFALT is 0.385 and there-
fore almost identical to the 0.375 coefficient of DEFEX reported in equa-
tion (1.1). The standard error of DEFALT is, however, only 0.031 or less
than half of the standard error of the coefficient of DEFEX, reflecting the
fact that the alternative variable has far less "noise" in it. This is also seen
in the sharp rise of the correctedfrom0.78 in equation (1.1) to 0.95 in
equation (1.2). The other coefficients are not changed in any substantial
way. Although DEFALT seems clearly to be a better variable than the
DEFEX variable, the latter does have the virtue that its construction in-
volved less discretion and I will continue to present results for DEFEX.
Because the coefficient of the inflation variable is much smaller than its
standard error, it is desirable to conserve the very scarce degrees of free-
dom by reestimating the equation with the INFEX variable omitted. This
is done in equation (1.3). None of the remaining coefficients or standard
errors changes appreciably.
Instead of omitting the rolling ARIMA forecast variable, equation (1.4)
replaces it with a polynomial distributed lag on the annual changes of
the GNP deflator. The distributed lag coefficients are constrained to sat-
isfy a third-order polynomial on six lagged values of the annual rate of
change of the GNP deflator with no restriction on the final weight. The
sum of the implied coefficients is —0.098 with a standard error of 0.082.
The monetary base variable remains essentially unchanged with this re-
specification. The coefficient of MPRIR drops to —0.016 and is com-
pletely insignificant (standard error 0.077); this is reassuring since an
insignificant coefficient is quite plausible while a significantly negative
one cannot be justified. Finally, the coefficient of DEFEX drops to 0.254
but remains both statistically significant and economically very power-
ful. The corrected R2statisticof 0.84 shows that the polynomial dis-
tributed lag specification has slightly greater explanatory power than the
more constrained INFEX specification.
Since the MPRIR variable is either insignificant or significant with the
wrong sign, it is useful to see the implications of omitting it from the
specification. This is done in equation (1.5). The coefficient of the DEFEXThe BudgetDeficit377
variable is 0.234, indicating that the decline in the coefficient value ob-
served in equation (1.4) was due to the small size of the MPRIR coef-
ficient rather than to the change in the inflation variable per Se. This
specification is clearly inferior to the previous ones, with a much lower
correctedanda very much lower Durbin-Watson statistic.
To deal with the low Durbin-Watson statistic, equation (1.5) was re-
estimated with a first-order transformation. Since this still had a low
Durbin-Watson statistic, a second-order autocorrelation correction was
used. This is shown in equation (1.6). The DEFEX coefficient has re-
mained essentially unchanged at 0.236 and the MBGRO coefficient has
returned to —0.060.Theinflation coefficient is now the same size as its
standard error. This variable is dropped in equation (1.7) where the
other coefficients remain essentially unchanged.
The specification of the MPRIR variable requires assuming a particular
marginal debt-equity ratio and a particular yield difference between
equity and debt. An alternative measure of the effect of changes in tax
rules and in the tax-inflation interaction is to use the less restricted vari-
able MPRNR, the maximum potential real net return. This alternative is
used in equations (1.8) through (1.10).
Equation (1.8) parallels (1.1) except for the substitution of MPRNR for
MPRIR. The DEFEX variable is essentially unchanged (0.343 with a
standard error of 0.123) while the MPRNR is statistically insignificant.
MBGRO is similar to its earlier value (—0.054) and the INFEX variable
is now nearly twice its standard error (—0.070 with a standard error
of 0.039). A first-order autocorrelation correction actually lowers the
Durbin-Watson statistic.
A far better specification is obtained by substituting the polynomial
distributed lag for the INFEX variable (equation 1.10). This combination
of variables has the highest corrected R2statistic(0.86) of all the regres-
sions that include the DEFEX variable and a Durbin-Watson statistic of
2.48. The coefficient of the DEFEX variable is 0.283 with a standard error
of only 0.075. MBGRO and PDLINF are both negative and nearly twice
their standard errors while the coefficient of MPRNR is satisfactorily less
than its standard error.
Equation (1.11) is similar to (1.1) but constrains the monetary base
growth not to appear in the equation. Although the resulting specifica-
tion is not very satisfactory, the coefficient of DEFEX remains almost un-
changed from equation (1.1).
Finally, equation (1.12) substitutes the rate of growth of Ml for the rate
of growth of the monetary base. The coefficients are generally similar to
those of equation (1.1) but the overall goodness of fit is slightly worse.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tests involve adding several new variables as well as considering some of
the variations discussed in table 1. All of the results again support the
conclusion that the coefficient of the expected deficit is statistically sig-
nificant and economically powerful.
Equation (2.1) starts with the basic specification of equation (1.1) and
adds a dummy variable equal to one for the years 1980 through 1984 and
zero for the previous years. The purpose of the dummy variable is to test
whether the dollar was strong in the 1980s for any of a variety of other-
wise unspecified reasons (the new monetary policy regime that began in
October 1979; the Reagan presidency; the increased importance of the
United States as a political safe haven for foreign capital). if some com-
bination of omitted variables did indeed raise the dollar in the 1980s
above what it would otherwise have been, the equations of table 1 might
have imputed this to the large expected deficits or to some other variable
that distinguished the 1980s from previous years. Including a specific
dummy variable should eliminate this source of bias.
Rather surprisingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the 1980s
(DUM8O+) is negative, about twice its standard error and quite large in
absolute size (about —0.25). This implies that the unspecified factors at
work inthe1980s had the effect of lowering the dollar relative to the Ger-
man mark in comparison to the earlier years. Faced with the negativeco-
efficient, it is of course possible to identify possible explanations. For•
example, the decline in OPEC financial assets during most of the 1980s
reduced the demand for dollar securities relative to DM securities. The
conservative political victories in Germany and Britain, and the switch in
French economic policy, may have revived the demand for portfolio in-
vestment in Europe.
The important point to note about these arguments is that they imply
that the actual rise of the dollar in the 1980s is even more surprising and
that the combined role of those factors that systematically raised the dol-
lar was even stronger. The other coefficients of equation (2.1) show that
the primary effect of including DUM8O+ is to raise the coefficient of
DEFEX from 0.375 to 0.525.
The DUM8O+ variable appears in most of the specifications of table 2.
Its coefficient is almost always about twice its standard error and it has
the effect of raising the coefficient of DEFEX to 0.5 or above. Although it
is of course possible that the DUM8O+ variable is spurious, it is not nec-
essary to decide this question in order to say whether the rise in the
expected budget deficit was an important cause of the increase in the
dollar. That is dearly an implication of the specifications of tabel 1 with-
out the DUM8O+ variable as well as of the equations in table 2 with the
DUM8O+ variable.FELDSTEIN
Equation (2.2) drops the INFEX variable and equation (2.3) replaces it
with the polynomial distributed lag. Equation (2.4) omits the tax variable
while equation (2.5) switches to the relatively unconstrained MPRNR
specification. Equation (2.6), with no tax variable and with the distrib-
uted lag specification of the inflation variable is one of the few specifica-
tions in which the coefficient of the DUM8O+ variable is only slightly
greater than its standard error. In this specification, the coefficient of the
DEFEX variable is reduced to the level of 0.343, approximately its value
in the equations without the DUM8O+variable.
Equations (2.7) through (2.11) include the annual growth of real GNP
(GNPGRO)as an additional explanatory variable. When the DUM8O+
variable is not present (equations 2.7 and 2.8), the GNPGRO variable
is only slightly greater than its standard error. The DEFEX coefficients
are raised by a small amount and the inflation variables are insignifi-
cant. When the DUM8O+ variable is present, the GNPGRO coefficients
are quite significant and the DEFEX coefficients are increased to more
than 0.5.
Finally, equation (2.2) adds the net international investment position
of the United States as a percent of GNP (NH!'.). Its coefficient is very
much less than its standard error and the remaining coefficients are very
similar to the coefficients of equation (1.8) (which has the same specifica-
tion except for the NHP variable). The statistical insignificance of this co-
efficient should not be overinterpreted. As I noted above, the net stock
of accumulated assets may not be truly exogenous since the decline in
NH!' in the 1980s has been the cumulative result of the high value of the
dollar and the resulting current account deficits.'3
Table 3 extends the analysis of tables 1 and 2 to include the German
deficit and monetary base variables. For reference, the basic specifica-
tion of equation (1.1) is repeated in equation (3.1). Adding the variable
that measures the ratio of expected German deficits to GNP (DEFEXG)
and the growth of the German monetary base (MBGROG) does not alter
the other coefficients subtantially but does cause the standard errors to
become quite large (equation (3.2)). The additional variables also leave
the corrected R2unchanged.
The increased standard errors are perhaps not surprising since equa-
tion (3.2) has six coefficients and a constant term to estimate with only
twelve observations. Dropping the German monetary base variable
13.Whenequation (2.12) was estimated withthestock of foreign private assets in the
United States as a percentage of GNP instead of NIIP, its coefficient hadthewrong sign
(positive) and was statistically significant. This again no doubtreflectsthefact that for-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(equation (3.3)) leaves the coefficients of the four U.S. variables very.
similar to the basic specification of equation (3.1) but with very large
standard errors. The coefficient of the German deficit variable is small
and only about one-tenth of its standard error.
In an attempt to reduce the problem of the large standard errors, these
equations are repeated with the standard DEFEX variable replaced
by the alternative DEFALT variable in which the observations for 1977
through 1980 are modified to assume that the 1980 deficit-GNP ratio was
projected forward until after the 1980 election. Equation (1.2) indicated
that this substitution leaves the coefficient of the deficit and other vari-
ables essentially unchanged while reducing their standard errors. The
effect is similar in equation (3.4). The coefficient of DEFALT is 0.414 with
a standard error of 0.103. The coefficients of MPRIR and MBGRO are
very similar to their values in equation (3.1) but with smaller standard
errors. The coefficient of INFEX remains very much smaller than its stan-
dard error. The coefficients of the two German variables are again much
smaller than their standard errors.
Dropping the insignificant MBGROG and INFEX variables and the
MPRIR variable which has an inadmissible sign lead to equation (3.5) in
which the three remaining variables are statistically significant and have
the correct sign. In this equation, which is estimated after a second-order
autocorrelation transformation, the coefficient of DEFALT is 0.202 (with
a standard error of 0.058) and in which the coefficient of the German
deficit variable is —0.173 with a standard error of 0.087.
This coefficient structure is, however, quite fragile. Adding the INFEX
variable produces a coefficient of —0.016 with a standard error of 0.013
while the coefficient of the German deficit variable drops to —0.067 and
less than half of its standard error.
In short, it seems from table 3 that the German deficit variable does
not have a significant or stable relation to the dollar-DM ratio and that
the decision of whether or not to include it does not alter the point esti-
mate of the U.S. deficit variable. Future work will be needed to assess
whether some combination of German and other European deficits is
significant and whether its presence alters the coefficient of the U.S.
budget deficit variable.
It is, of course, unfortunate that the history of the floating rate period
gives us only twelve years of experience to analyze. Although more data
points could be created by using quarterly observations, I believe very
little (if any) additional information on DEFEX and MPRIR would actu-
ally result. Instead, there would be more measurement error in the
"expectations" variables (DEFEX, INFEX, MPRJR) relative to the actual
variation. Looking back before 1973 is inappropriate because the quasi-r
The Budget Deficit383
fixed rate system that existed then would imply very different exchange-
rate dynamics and might be expected to have very different monetary
policy responses as countries tried to maintain their currencies at the
fixed parities. Expectations would also be formed differently in a regime
in which governments were committed to maintaining fixed exchange
rates and in which the United States appeared willing to accumulate
overseas investments or run down its assets in order to maintain that
fixed rate system.
6. Effects of the Interest Differential
I have already commented (in section 2) on the difficulty of assessing the
structural relation between the exchange rate and the difference in ex-
pected real interest rates. The expected inflation rate, which is a very
critical component of the calculation, is difficult to measure and the real
interest rates themselves are endogenous variables.
Despite these difficulties, it is worth devoting some attention to the es-
timation of a structural equation linking the exchange rate to the real
interest differential because it is the operational link between budget
deficits and the exchange rate in several analytic models. The prob-
lems of measurement and of endogeneity can be mitigated by using an
instrumental variable procedure with the DEFEX, MBGRO, and INFEX
variables as the instruments. The results indicate that the use of an in-
strumental variable procedure is important and that, when it is used, the
evidence shows a substantial effect of the real interest differential on the
exchange rate.
Equation (4.1) of table 4 presents an ordinary-least-squares regression
of the exchange rate index on the difference between the real long-term
interest rate in the United States and a corresponding real long-term in-
terest rate for Germany. The nominal U.S. rate is the yield on Treasury
bonds with five years to maturity. The real rate is calculated by subtract-
ing the ARIMA projection (INFEX) from this nominal rate. The nominal
German rate is a rate on long-term German government bonds.'4 The real
rate is calculated by subtracting an ARIMA estimate of future German
inflation calculated by the same process used for the U.S. ARIMA fore-
cast of inflation. Annual values of these variables are shown in appendix
table A-2.
The coefficient of the real interest rate differential is 0.042 with a stan-
dard error of 0.025. The Durbin-Watson statistic is very low and the
14. The German interest rate was provided by Data Resources, Inc. and is identified by

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































equation is reestimated with an autocorrelation transforma-
tion. A first-order transformation (equation (4.2)) is inadequate so the
final result (presented in equation (4.3)) has a second-order autocorrela-
tion correction. In this form, the coefficient of the interest differential is
0.034 with a standard error of 0.022.
When the equation is estimated by art instrumental variable procedure
(equation (4.4)), the coefficient of the interest rate differential becomes
much larger (0.082) and more than twice its standard error. The Durbin-
Watson statistic is, however, very small (0.56). When Fair's method is
used to obtain an instrumental variable estimate with a first-order auto-
correlation correction, the coefficient falls to 0.054 with a standard error
of 0.023. In short, the instrumental variable procedure results in a slightly
larger coefficient than the OLS procedure. It might also be noted that
these coefficient estimates are similar to the estimates of approximately
0.06 obtained by Sachs (1985) and Hooper (1985).
Before looking at any further equation estimates, it is helpful to con-
sider the implications of a coefficient of approximately 0.04 to 0.06 on the
interest rate differential. In 1978—79, the estimated real long-term U.S.
rate exceeded the corresponding German rate by 0.7 percent; by 1983 the
differential was 1.4 percent and by 1984 it was 2.8 percent. Even a coeffi-
cient of 0.06 implies a rise in the dollar-DM real exchange rate of 0.042
between 1980 and 1983 and of 0.126 between 1980 and 1984. Since the
actual exchange rate rose by 0.72 points over this period, the equation
can account for at most one-fifth of the actual rise.
The estimated coefficient is far less than theory suggests. An increase
of one percentage point in the difference between U.S. and German 10-
year real interest rates should increase the dollar-DM exchange rate by
about twelve percentage points, not the four to six percentage points es-
timated here and in previous studies. This implies that the coefficient
may be grossly underestimated because of the measurement and simul-
taneity problems referred to above.
When the interest differential is split into two separate interest rates
and the equation estimated by ordinary least squares, only the coeffi-
cient of the U.S. rate is statistically significant. This remains true when
the equation is reestimated with a second-order autocorrelation correc-
tion (equation (4.7)) and by an instrumental variable procedure (equa-
tion (4.8)).
However, the combination of instrumental variable estimation and a
first-order autocorrelation correction (Fair's method) does result (equa-
tion (4.9)) in coefficients for the U.S. and German interest variables that
are both absolutely about 0.04 but with the appropriate opposite signs.
More specifically, the coefficient of the real U.S. rate is 0.046 (with a stan-FELDSTEIN
dard error of 0.024) while the coefficient of real German rate is —0.037
(with a standard error of 0.024).
As an alternative to the rolling ARIMA procedure, I have also used a
simpler method that may correspond more closely to the way that market
participants used past inflation experience to form judgments about the
future. In place of the ARIMA estimate of inflation, I use a weighted
average of inflation, giving a weight of 0.5 to the most recent year's infla-
tion, of 0.33 to the inflation of the previous year's inflation and of 0.17 to
the inflation of the year before that. On that basis, the expected inflation
came down gradually in Germany from 4.5 percent in 1980 to 4.3 percent
in 1981 and 1982, 3.8 percent in 1983, and 2.8 percent in 1984, and real
German long-term rates in the 1980—84 period stayed between 4.0 and
5.0 percent except for a 6.1 percent rate in 1981.
Table 5 presents the results based on this simpler specification of ex-
pected inflation. The OLS estimates (equations (5.1) and (5.2)) are simi-
lar to the estimates with the ARIMA inflation forecast: a coefficient of
0.055 with a standard error of 0.035. The instrumental variable estimates
(equations (5.3) and (5.4)) show a more substantial coefficient and a
smaller standard error of regression measures than the ARIMA forecast.
With the AR1 correction (i.e., using Fair's method), the coefficient of the
interest differential is 0.081 with a standard error of 0.031. This is ap-
proximately twice the typical estimate based on the ARIMA inflation
forecast. Dividing the interest differential into a real U.S. rate and a real
German rate (equation (5.5)) results in a coefficient of 0.072 (with a stan-
dard error of 0.025) for the U.S. real rate but a very small and statistically
insignificant coefficient of 0.003 (with a standard error of 0.032) for the
German real rate, possibly because there was very little variation in the
measured real rate for Germany.
In short, the different specifications of the real interest differentials
and the different estimation methods indicate that each percentage point
difference in real interest rates raises the real exchange rate by between
0.04 and 0.08 points, an impact that accounts for only a small part of the
rise in the exchange rate that actually occurred in the 1980s and also only
a small part of the rise in the exchange rate that is predicted by the
changes in the expected budget deficits and in monetary policy. It is
difficult to tell whether this is because the real interest differential is
measured very badly (causing a substantial underestimate of the true co-
efficient) or because the budget deficit and monetary policy have direct

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The findings of the current research can be summarized briefly. The esti-
mated reduced-form equations for the dollar-DM real exchange rate
imply that the rise in the expected future deficits in the budget of the
U.S. government had a powerful effect on the exchange rate between the
dollar and the German mark. Each one percentage point increase in
the ratio of future budget deficits to GNP increases the exchange rate by
about thirty percentage points.
Changes in the growth of the monetary base also affect the exchange
rate, but the estimated effect of the deficit does not depend on whether
this is taken into account in the estimation procedure.
The analysis also indicates that the changes in tax rules and in the
inflation-tax interaction that altered the corporate demand for funds did
not have any discernible effect on the exchange rate. The presence or ab-
sence of alternative tax variables did not alter the estimated effect of the
budget deficit.
The estimated effect of the budget deficit is also relatively insensitive
to the other variables that were induded in the regression equation.
As I have emphasized elsewhere in a different context (Feldstein 1982),
all models are "false" in the sense that they involve substantial sim-
plifications that can lead to incorrect inferences. It is impossible to relax
all of the specification constraints or include all of the plausible variables
in any single model. We learn about reality only by examining a variety
of alternative false models to see which implications of these models are
robust. In the present study, I was eager to focus on the question of
whether changes in the expected budget deficit could account for shifts
in the real exchange rate and, if so, whether this was a spurious relation
that was really reflecting a more fundamental relationship between the
exchange rate and tax rules, monetary policy, inflation, German budget
deficits, or unobservable characteristics of the 1980s that strengthened
the dollar. Although any econometric study leaves room for doubt and
uncertainty, I believe that the current evidence shifts the burden of proof
to those who would claim that deficits do not matter or that tax, mone-
tary, or "confidence" variables were the real reasons for the dollar's
strength since 1980.
There are of course a number of things that have been omitted from
the analysis that deserve attention in future studies. It would be good to
model the changing behavior of expected European budget deficits or,
even more generally, the changing balance between the supply and de-
mand for funds in Europe. There are a number of difficulties in doing so,The Budget Deficit389
including the problem of establishing the "full employment" level at
which to estimate structural deficits in the face of Europe's rapidly rising
unemployment and the much larger and more ambiguous role of public
investment in Europe.
U.S. budget deficits have been defined without correction for the in-
flation erosion of the public debt on the implicit assumption that, at the
observed rates of inflation, individuals did not adjust their saving but
treated the inflation component of the interest on the public debt as
income.
Shifts in the price of oil were ignored in the present study although
they presumably affected the equilibrium exchange rate between the DM
and the dollar. It should be possible to extend the analysis to include the
price of oil and other raw materials.
Finally, in future work I plan to extend the analysis to include 1985 and
the decline of the dollar. The sharp rise in the dollar-DM ratio that cli-
maxed in the early spring of 1985 may have had some unsustainable
speculative element (as Krugrnan's 1985 analysis implies) but the decline
of more than 20 percent in the dollar-DM ratio between mid-1984 and the
present time is, I believe, quite in line with what would have been ex-
pected on the basis of the fall in expected future budget deficits.
As participants in financial markets studied the action of Congress in
the spring and early summer of 1985, there was growing confidence that
some significant action would be taken to reduce future budget deficits.
The Congressional Budget Office summarized this in August when it
contrasted the current services deficits of 5.1 percent of GM? each year
from 1986 to 1990 with the results of the Congressional Budget Resolu-
tion that brought the projected deficits onto a path that declined to 3.0
percent of GNP in 1988 and 2.1 percent in 1990. The Gramm-Rudman
amendment gave the markets even greater confidence that budget defi-
cits would continue to decline in the future.
The estimated ratio of the expected 5-year structural deficit to poten-
tial GM? has declined from 3.3 percent in 1984 (the last observation in
the sample) to about 2.6 percent in early 1986. An estimated coefficient
of 0.25 to 0.40 would imply a decline in the dollar from this source alone
of between 18 and 28 points. In fact, as of mid-February 1986, the dollar-
DM ratio was down 23 points in comparison to its 1984 average value and
32 points from its high in early 1985.
There is substantial room for additional research on the determinants
of the exchange rate. But the massive fiscal experiment of the past six
years should have convinced us that sustained shifts in the federal gov-
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1973 6.868 9.323 4.500 4.869 5.093 6.313
1974 7.802 10.383 7.500 5.494 7.037 6.555
1975 7.766 8.483 9.700 6.101 8.535 6.405
1976 7.179 7.800 5.800 6.125 7.173 4.982
1977 6.990 6.158 6.000 5.603 6.193 4.062
1978 8.318 5.733 6.400 5.284 6.500 3.990
1979 9.518 7.425 7.000 4.902 7.770 4.053
1980 11.478 8.500 7.600 4.812 8.725 4.462
1981 14.236 10.383 8.000 4.495 9.324 4.288
1982 13.006 8.950 7.000 4.050 7.751 4.320
1983 10.796 7.892 5.600 4.048 5.520 3.802
1984 12.241 7.775 5.500 3.874 4.159 2.771
IUS =yieldon 5-year government bonds;
IG =yieldon long-term German government bonds;
INFPUS (ARIMA) =U.S.inflation predicted by ARJMA method;
INFPG (ARIMA) =Germaninflation predicted by ARIMA method;
INFPUS (PAST) =U.S.inflation predicted by average of past values;
INFPG (PAST) =Germaninflation predicted by average of past values.
I am grateful to Andrew Berg for help with this work and to Rudiger Dornbusch, Jeff rey
Frankel, Paul Krugman and Jeffrey Sachs for discussions about this subject.
REFERENCES
Barro, R. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy
(November). 82: 1095—118..
Blanchard, 0. 1985. Debts1 deficits and finite horizons. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 93 (April): 223—47.
Blanchard, 0., and L. Summers. 1985. Perspectives on high world real interest
rates. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 273—324.
Branson, W. 1985. Causes of appreciation and volatility of the dollar. NBER
Working Paper 1777.
Dombusch, R. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political
Economy (December). 84: 1161—76.
1983. Comment on floating exchange rates after ten years. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1983: 1
Evans, P. 1985. Do large deficits produce high interest rates?" American Economic
Review 75 (March): 68—87.
1986. Is the dollar high because of large budget deficits? Journal of Mone-
tary Economics. Forthcoming.
Feldstein, M. 1982. Inflation, tax rules and investment: Some econometric evi-
dence. (The 1980 Fisher-Schultz Lecture of the Econometric Society), Econo-
metrica 50(4): 825—62.
1983. Why the dollar is strong. In Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar,392 FELDSTEIN
Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Monetary Policy,
House of Representatives, October 1985 (reprinted in Challenge Magazine, 1984).
1985. American economic policy and the world economy. Foreign Affairs
63 (Summer): 995—1008.
• 1986a. U.S. budget deficits and the European economies: Resolving the
political economic puzzle. American Economic Review 76 (May).
• 1986b. Budget deficits, tax rules and real interest rates. NBER Working
Paper (Forthcoming).
Feldstein, M., and P. Bacchetta. 1986. U.S. budget deficits and European unem-
ployment: The German experience. Forthcoming.
Feldstein, M., and L. Summers. 1978. Inflation, tax rules and the long-term in-
terest rate. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (January): 61—99.
Feldstein, M., and J. Jun. 1986. The effects of tax rules on nonresidential fixed
investment: Some preliminary evidence from the 1980s. Forthcoming in
M. Feldstein, ed., Taxation and Capital Formation.
Frankel, J. 1979. On the mark: A theory of floating exchange rates based on real
interest differentials. American Economic Review 69 (September): 610—22.
1982. A test of perfect substitutability in the foreign exchange market.
Southern Economic Journal 49 (October): 406—16.
1985. Causes of appreciation and volatility of the dollar. NBER Working
Paper 1377.
Frenkel, J., and A. Razin. 1984. The international transmission of fiscal error and
budget deficits in the world economy. NBER Working Paper 1527.
1986. The international transmission and effects of fiscal policies. NBER
Working Paper 1799.
Hooper, P. 1985. International repercussions of the U.S. budget deficit. Brook-
ings Discussion Paper 27 (February).
Hutchinson, M., and A. Throop. 1985. U.S. budget deficits and the real value of
the dollar. Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Fall.
Krugrnan, P. 1985. Is the strong dollar sustainable? NBER Working Paper 1644.
McKinnon, R. 1984. An international standard for monetary stabilization. Policy
Analyses in International Economics No. 8, Institute for International Economics.
Meese, R., and K. Rogoff. 1983. Empirical exchange rate models of the seventies:
Do they fit out of sample? Journal of International Economics 14: 3—24.
1985. Was it real? The exchange rate—interest differential relation, 1973—
1984. NBER Working Paper 1732.
Obstfeld, M. 1985. Floating exchange rates: Experience and prospects. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2: 369—450.
Plosser, C. 1982. Government financing decisions and asset returns. Journal of
Monetary Economics 9 (May): 325—52.
Price, R. W. R. and P. Muller. 1984. Structural budget indicators and the inter-
pretation of fiscal policy stance in OECD economies. In OECD Economic Studies
3 (Autumn).
Sachs, J. 1985. The dollar and the policy mix: 1985. NBER Working Paper 1636.
Forthcoming in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Sinai, A. 1985. The dollar and inflation. Economic Studies Series, Shearson Lehman
Brothers, Inc. (November). (Reprinted from the Eastern Economic Journal, Pro-
ceedings: Eleventh Annual Conference, July/August 1985.)393
Comment
RUDIGER DORNBUSCH
Massachusetts institute of Technology
In the area of international economics Feldstein never fails to be provoca-
tive. In his analysis of the integration of international capital markets
(Feldstein and Horioka (1980)) he posed a puzzle that stifi stands un-
answered. This article is in much the same tradition: it explores the Feld-
stein doctrine according to which budget deficits translate into currency
appreciation, the Mitterand experiment notwithstanding. Of course,
this time the shock is more on Washington rather than the professional
audience. The effect is familiar from the Mundell-Flemmirig model (Mun-
dell (1963)) which remains, with suitable extensions, the ruling paradigm
of textbook open-economy macroeconomics.
Feldstein's article takes the Mundell-Flemming paradigm and tries to
quantify it in the context of the dollar-DM exchange rate. What is the
impact on the level of the exchange rate of an extra dollar of prospec-
tive budget deficits? Are budget deficits, not safe haven and monetary
effects, the primary explanation for the strong dollar in 1981—85? This is
really an important issue, one that quantitative international economics
has simply failed to address. Almost all the work concentrates on inter-
est rates and money, and virtually no one has paid attention to the quan-
titative plausibility of the Mundell-Flemming result, even in those cases
where the policy mix is in fact the central focus of the analysis.
HYPOTHESES
Feldstein reviews four hypotheses for the strong dollar: safe haven argu-
ments, interest rate differentials, capital investment profitability effects
and the proper Feldstein doctrine. Safe Haven: Feldstein does not think
much of the safe haven hypothesis. The evidence is primarily anecdotal:
what changed between Carter's hostage crisis and the U.S. invasion of
Grenada? Is the perception that Carter was a loser and Reagan a winner
at all relevant to international portfolio choice? It seems to me that the
relevant question must be what, if any, the link between these political
perceptions and the dollar would be. Suppose that in fact the United
States was perceived as the place in the sun, does that necessarily mean a
stronger dollar must result? Is the implication of a politically stronger
United States that people will shift into nominal dollar assets at a re-
duced risk premium, or into U.S. stocks, or that they choose to locate394 DORNBUSCH
their assetsinthe U.S. jurisdiction? And does a stronger United States
mean that the allies—Germany and the U.K., for example, are weaker?
The answers to these questions are not obvious. It certainly is not the
case that the risk premium on U.S. assets fell in this period. On the con-
trary, the relative rates of return in the United States increased. But Feld-
stein apparently does not see the one point where safe haven effects are
in fact appropriate. He argues that the absence of large shifts in direct
investment and the predominance of a reversal of banking flows argues
against the safe haven hypothesis. However, banking flows are the only
area where safe haven arguments really apply: LDC loans were becom-
ing politically risky when it beame conceivable that insolvent debtors
might elect to default.
Although I also do not have any evidence to support my belief I do
agree with Feldstein that interest rates and fundamentals remain the
chief magnet for capital flows, particularly for crazy money. There is
really no difference between the Argentine experience under Martinez
de Hoz and our own under Secretary Regan.
Real Interest RatesFeldstein makes much of the point that theory estab-
lishes a link between long-term real interest differentials and the exchange
rate, not short-term differentials. That point is, I think, exaggerated or
actually wrong, depending on the vigor with which it is advocated. If
capital mobility is taken to be perfect, portfolio holders will bring about
equalization of nominal rates adjusted for anticipated depreciation:
=i+e(1)
where i, i and e denote home and foreign nominal interest rates and the
anticipated rate of depreciation. Subtracting national inflation rates (ir,
ir)onboth sides and using the definition of the rate of change of the real
exchange rate, që +rr—irwe have a relation between real inter-
est rates:
r= r+ q.(2)
We supplement this model with an adjustment equation for the actual
real exchange rate to the long-run equilibrium rate, q,
= — q).(3)Comment 395
Such an equation arises in models such as Dornbusch (1976) from the
gradual adjustment of prices. Combining equations (2) and (3) then
yields the link between the real exchange rate and real interest rates:
(4)
This model thus establishes a link between the movement of the equi-
librium real exchange rate and the real interest differential over time. The
more rapid the adjustment of the real exchange rate as measured by the
size of a the smaller the impact of short-term real interest rate distur-
bances on the equilibrium real exchange rate. Clearly the theory can be
stated in terms of short-term differentials.
But it is essential to recognize that the model developed here emerges
when we consider exclusively the path of real interest rates and real ex-
change rates in response to a permanent monetary disturbance. When
fiscal disturbances are considered, equation (4) no longer applies. This
point is easily sketched for the case of a transitory fiscal expansion in the
extended Mundell-Flemming model.1 Figure 1 shows the schedule E =0
along which the price level is such that home real balances are at a level at
which the equilibrium interest rate is equal to that abroad. Along p= 0
the goods market clears with government spending at its long-run level.
An unanticipated, transitory increase in demand for dometsic goods due
to higher government spending leads to an immediate appreciation from
E to E'. Then, over time, as government spending falls off the real ex-
change rate depreciates until in long-run equffibrium it returns to its ini-
tial level.
Note that now there is no longer a simple link between interest differ-
entials and the level of the real exchange rate as in equation (4). The ini-
tial level and the pace of decline of the level of government spending will
appear as determinants of the real exchange rate. In fact, at point E'the
real interest rate at home has declined while the level of the real ex-
change rate has appreciated and is appreciating. The real exchange rate
in this extended model then becomes a function not only of monetary
variables but also of the prospective path of fiscal variables.
The problems encountered in identifying an interest differential—
exchange rate relation in empirical work presumably reflects the role
played by other variables, including fiscal shocks, in the exchange rate—
interest rate relation. This point is, of course, reinforced if imperfect sub-
2. The model explored here is Dornbusch (1976) with the addition of an equation for real
government spending on domestic goods. It is assumed that government spending fol-
lows the simple rule g =—p(gg) where g denotes long-run government spending.396 DORNBUSCH
stitutability between assets is the rule, as Feldstein believes is the case.
In that event interest rate movements may simply represent risk pre-
miums rather than excess returns. They tell us little except that their de-
terniinants—relative asset supplies and the stochastic structure—are a
necessary part of the model.
Channels of TransmissionFeldstein's article leaves no doubt that fiscal
deficits will lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate. But little effort
is made to identify the exact channels that bring about this result.
In the argument above, fiscal policy affects the real exchange rate exclu-
sively via its effect on demand. There is no room for the impact of debt
accumulation, debt service, crowding out, or all the other possible chan-










nels. In this very simplified model fiscal policy has entirely unambigu-
ous effects. But once we go to more complicated models that is no longer
the case.
Work by Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), Hooper and Morton (1982),
Sachs and Wyplosz (1984) and Frankel (1982) has focused on other chan-
nels. First, the accumulation of debt will bring about a future service
burden. While current resources are attracted from abroad to meet an
increase in demand, and thus lead to appreciation, in the future demand
will be reduced and accumulated debt will require servicing. Thus in the
future there will be real depreciation. This consideration brings up the
question of the persistence of the initial real appreciation.
In forward-looking asset markets more persistent deficits require ulti-
mately larger trade surpluses and thus, other things being equal, larger
real depreciation. But forward-looking asset holders also recognize that
more persistent deficits imply ultimately larger taxes and that might
dampen their current spending, reducing the need for crowding out via
the real exchange rate. On the other hand, if they are Blanchard-style
taxpayers they expect that more distant fiscal correction means that most
of the bill ultimately will be paid by someone else, thus reducing the off-
setting impact of prospective taxes on demand. Does the conjunction of
all these channels mean that the initial real appreciation will be smaller
the more persistent the fiscal expansion?
So far nothing has been said about the impact of debt accumulation
per se on interest rates. Feldstein makes much of this point, but it is not
obvious where it comes from. Is it that government deficit finance raises
the relative supply of domestic securities and hence the required risk
premium? Or is the increase in interest rates the result of increased de-
mand at full employment inaworld of perfect asset substitution? The
answer is very important. It is quite possible that deficit finance may not
involve any appreciation if, in one case, the financing is done by issuing
foreign debt, and in the other, if the deficit involves increased demand
for foreign goods. If the deficits vary significantly in their makeup, fl-
nancing, and persistence it might be hopeless to get any significant relà-
tion between deficits and exchange rates.
The same considerations apply to Feldstein's argument that increased
profitability of investment should lead to appreciation. Does the in-
creased spending fall on domestic or foreign goods? What is the distri-
bution of adjustment between world interest rates and real exchange
rates? If the investment opportunities increase the future supply of U.S.
outpu.t beyond the increase in demand, they will bring about an ultimate
real depreciation. Why then should the adjustment be one of apprecia-
tion followed by depreciation rather than a sharp increase in world inter-398 DORNBUSCH
est rates even combined with an initial real depreciation? Theoretically
there is absolutely no presumption unless one believes that current de-
mand effects dominate because goods are very imperfect substitutes and
demand in each country falls nearly exclusively on domestic goods so
that transfer problems predominate. But such a world where the future
matters very little is clearly not one that would be very congenial to Feld-
stein. All this is to say that while he has an unshakeable faith in the
budget-exchange rate link, theory is not so firmly on his side although
the facts may well be.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The central point of the article is the empirical evidence in support of the
Feldstein doctrine. Here it is shown that a five-year forward-looking
measure of U.S. budget deficits appears as a sturdily significant explana-
tory variable in a dollar-DM real exchange rate equation. Other explana-
tory variables such as the Reagan-Dummy, the net foreign investment
position, money growth and inflation forecasts round out the equation,
though with less striking significance. If the point of the article is to
demonstrate the central role of budget deficits in explaining the dollar
appreciation a full success might be claimed.
I will not dwell on the obvious problems: the U.S. foreign investment
position, counting direct investment at book value, makes little sense
and changes in it are hard to link to the exchange rate. Monetary growth
certainly is not exogeneous and certainly is not a good predictor of infla-
tion in periods of vast velocity shocks.
The chief problem of the empirical tests is the predominant use of U.S.
variables alone to explain the dollar-DM rate. European deficits too
should affect the exchange rate. Why then not introduce symmetry at
least? This point is obvious. No one would argue that the steep apprecia-
tion of the dollar in 1923 was due to the Mellon tax cuts rather than the
German hyperinflation. It might be argued in the present context that
concentration on the United States and omission of Europe (except for
Germany in Feldstein's table 3) is justified because one is studying the
real exchange rate and because disturbances are primarily those in the
United States. But of course that is completely wrong. Fiscal distur-
bances abroad were almost as large as in the United States,. but of op-
posite sign. Table 1 shows the changes in cyclically adjusted budget
deficits for Germany, the U.S. and Japan in the past five years.
The Feldstein doctrine is certainly reinforced if we look at our deficits
and those abroad. It would have been an embarrassment if table 1 had
showed that there were even larger shifts in structural deficits abroad in
the same direction as in the United States. Of course, data problems withComment 399
past, current, and future structural deficits especially in Europe make it
difficult to test the hypothesis in a more symmetric fashion, but the
point cannot be neglected. This would be far more important at the
present time than the odd one- or two-percentage-point differential in
inflation or the prospective changes in the profitability of investment.
The fact that foreign deficits (not only German) matter just as much as
our own is brought out in the research by Hutchinson and Throop (1985)
which pursues exactly the same issue of a deficit-exchange rate link.
Table 2 shows their results for the multilateral U.S. real exchange rate
(REX), using the real interest differential, R —R,and U.S. as well as
foreign structural budget deficits, B and B respectively, as explanatory
variables.
The results in table 2 strongly support the Feldstein doctrine. A rise in
U.S. deficits leads to real appreciation of the multilateral real exchange
rate, a rise in foreign deficits to real depreciation of the dollar. The real
interest differential also appears as a significant determinant of the real
exchange rate. It is interesting to note from table 2 that the results do not
come exclusively from the post-1980 period of U.S. fiscal expansion. The
results are present also for the shorter sample period ending before the
Reagan deficits got under way. Moreover, the coefficients do not change
much between these periods.
Table 1CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN ADJUSTED
BUDGET DEFICIT: 1980—85(Percent of GNP)
Germany Japan United States
—4.2 —3.2 4.5
Source. OECD Economic Outlook, various issues.



















Table 2 THE HUTCHINSON-THROOP FINDINGS
(REX=a0+ a1(R*_R)+a2B+a3B*)
I-statistics in parentheses.
Source. Hutchinson and Throop (1985, p. 36)400 DORNBUSCH
The reason for the good performance in the earlier period is in part the
behavior of the yen and Japanese deficits. In the period 1975—78 the yen
appreciated relative to the dollar in real terms by 40 percent as a result
(among other factors, perhaps) of a shift in the Japanese Structural bud-
get toward deficit in the cumulative amount of 5.7 percent. In the follow-
ing period, 1979—84, the Japanese structural budget improved by 3.5
percent accompanied by.a 33 percent appreciation.
The case of Japan, and no doubt others, raises interesting questions
about the multilateral effects of a country's fiscal policies: Does a Japa-
nese fiscal expansion lead to an across-the-board appreciation against all
currencies in roughly the same proportion or are there significant inter-
country differences? In the U.S. case that question is of interest because
in 1982—84 the yen remained relatively constant, our fiscal expansion
notwithstanding. This point is well worth exploring in an explicit multi-
country estimation where a number of countries' real exchange rate re-
sponses to fiscal shocks of other countries would be studied.
This then raises the research agenda of testing the multilateral fiscal
effects by looking at the real exchange rate equations of various coun-
tries, perhaps in a seemingly unrelated regression to see whether fiscal
policies have significant effects on the pattern of multilateral rates or
merely a uniform impact on the rate of the expanding or contracting
countries. To some extent such work is already implicit in the Federal
Reserve's multilateral exchange rate model and in other aggregative
models of the world economy.2
A second of great interest is to know why real exchange rate
movements are so closely associated with current shifts in fiscal policy.
Why did the dollar decline in 1985,. as Gramm-Rudman got under way,
and not in 1984 when the recognition of unsustainable deficits was
dawning? In the same way why did the yen appreciate right up to 1978,
until 'fiscal policy turned around, rather than stopping much earlier in
recognition that deficits will ultimately be trimmed? Does this suggest
that the current demand aspect is very important or does it tell us some-
thing of the way people form expectations about the prospective path of
deficits? This, of course, is an important issue and. one would have liked
some more exploration in Feldstein's empirical analysis. The five-year
rule that he has imposed on the deficit variable is short if reckoned by
one's expected lifetime as a taxpayer and long if judged by short-run
Keynesian considerations.
2. SeeHooper(1985), Masson et al. (1985), Masson and Knight (1985) and van Wijnbergen
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Two issues, I believe, receive inadequate treatment. The first concerns
real interest rates. The high level of domestic long-run real interest rates
is attributed to fiscal expansion. The alternative hypothesis is that mone-
tary stabilization has frozen real balances at low levels. In the Voicker de-
flation monetary growth was not allowed to blip the real money stock
back to normal levels. Moreover such blips are not anticipated and hence
the entire time path of future real interest rates is affected by the recent
past of monetary policy. In this view fiscal policy is less important for
real interest rates and price stickiness assumes central importance for
real exchange rates and the current account.
The other point concerns Feldstein's research methodology—testing
"false" models. At one level this is inevitable. We will never be able to
test the complete, all-encompassing model. Hence any econometric
work in fact is testing false models. But there lower bounds on
such testing. Without such minimal standards we really have absolutely
no idea what the estimated coefficients might mean.
It is comforting to know that there is empirical support for the Feld-
stein doctrine. Mundell's research strategy was to judge the empirical
success of a theory by its theoretical plausibility. Feldstein comes from
the other side and has offered support for the openness of the U.S. econ-
omy. This opens up the task of identifying in much greater detail the par-
ticular channels of these fiscal effects.
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The thesis of Martin Feldstein's article is that current and prospective
government budget deficits in the United States were the main cause of
the appreciation of the dollar on foreign exchange markets from 1980 to
1985. According to him, the high budget deficits were responsible for
high real interest rates in the United States, and a high real interest rate
differential between the United States and the rest of the world. The ap-
preciation of the dollar is supposed to have resulted from this interest
rate differential.
The main evidence presented in the article consists of regressions of
the real exchange rate (the exchange-rate-adjusted ratio of price levels,
measured by GNPdeflators)between the United States and Germany on
a measure of the budget deficit in the United States and a set of other
variables. The estimated effect of the deficit on the real exchange rate is
strong and robust to inclusion or exclusion of other variables; the effects
of other variables on the real exchange rate are weaker. The picture of a
strong piece of evidence emerges. The major shortcoming of this evi-
dence (acknowledged by Feldstein) is that the regression covers only
twelve annual observations, from 1973 to 1984 (and only a single pair of
countries, the United States and Germany).
I will argue in these comments that (1) the evidence presented by Feld-
stein may be spurious and is in conflict with other evidence; (2) the evi-
dence regarding the effect of a budget deficit on the real exchange rate
combines two different effects, one from changes in government spend-
ing and the other from changes in tax revenue; and (3) the theoretical
argument outlined by Feldstein raises serious problems. Finally, one
could be more confident in the empirical results if they could be repli-
cated (a) over a longer period of time for the same country pair, (b) with
time-series data for other country pairs, and (c) if they were consistent
with cross-sectional evidence (i.e., if, at a given time, countries with
larger budget deficits tended to have currencies that are valued aboveComment 403
estimates from purchasing power parity). One could have greater confi-
dence in the interpretation of the• results—as a response to the deficit
per se rather than to changes in government expenditure (regardless of
the method of finance) or changes in tax revenue (regardless of the use
of that revenue)—if the results were robust against separate inclusion of
government spending (or tax revenue). I will argue that, based on these
criteria, our confidence in the results and the interpretation must be low.
Indeed, some evidence indicates a contrary result.
Spurious results are easy to obtain in a time series of twelve annual
observations, particularly if—as in this case—the main variation in the
data consists of a single change from a relatively stable real exchange rate
between 1973 to 1980 and a fairly steady dollar appreciation beginning
in 1980.
Feldstein uses a 5-year forward moving.average of the (projected) bud-
get deficit in his equations, on the ground that the real exchange rate and
real interest differential are affected by long-run budget deficits and not
simply by temporary deficits. This general point (insofar as it concerns
the interest rate) comes from theoretical models such as Blanchard (1985).
That model would predict something other than a 5-year moving average
as the appropriate measure, but the difference is probably unimportant.
The deficit, howeyer, is highly correlated with changes in government
purchases over this period of time, particularly national defense outlays.
It is likely that defense outlays (or total government purchases) would
provide about an equally good statistical explanation of changes in the
value of the dollar over this period of time as does the deficit.
Government spending, or defense outlays, may not be merely a spu-
rious variable. There are good theoretical reasons to expect that changes
in government spending affect the real exchange rate. Moreover, some
statistical evidence indicates that the effect is empirically important, and
that it is changes in government spending rather than changes in the
deficit that affect the real exchange rate.
Changes in government spending (such as defense spending) can have
a direct effect on the real exchange rate by shifting demands from for-
eign to domestic goods (if that is what the government purchases) and
thereby altering equilibrium relative prices. Because of the durability of
many of the goods that the government purchases, an increase in antici-
pated future defense outlays will have an immediate impact on relative
prices. This suggests that a longer-term moving average of government
purchases (and not simply the level over a quarter or a year) would affect
the real exchange rate. Therefore, a moving average of current and pro-
spective future levels of defense spending, rather than the current an-
nual level, might be the appropriate concept for empirical purposes.404 STOCKMAN
Paul Evans (1986) has recently examined quarterly changes in the ex-
change rate between the United States and seven other OECD countries
over the same time period as Feldstein's study. When changes in real gov-
ernment spending and the deficit are simultaneously included in an
equation for the exchange rate, his estimates show a sizable and statis-
tically significant effect of higher government spending, leading to real
appreciation, and a coefficient on the budget deficit that is opposite in
sign from Feldstein's estimates and sometimes statistically significant.
Evans's results show a larger U.S. deficit, given real government spend-
ing, leading to a dollar depreciation. When Evans included foreign vari-
ables in his equations, he found that greater foreign government spending
leads to dollar depreciation and greater foreign deficits lead to dollar ap-
preciation, with the estimated effects of U.S. government spending and
deficits remaining essentially unchanged.
Neither Feldstein nor Evans uses samples recent enough to include
the 1985 depreciation of the dollar. One could argue that projections of
a long-term fall in the deficit that emerged early in 1985 caused the
depreciation. On the other hand, changes in prospective government
spending, or in defense outlays alone, would probably also do as well as
the deficit in explaining the depreciation of the dollar after February
1985. The fall in projected deficits, e.g., by the Congressional Budget
Office, is predominantly a consequence of a fall in projected national de-
fense outlays over the next five years.
Feldstein's equations, by including the budget deficit but not its sepa-
rate components, confound changes in government expenditure, its
composition, tax revenue, and the value of the existing stock of govern-
ment debt due to changes in inflation and interest rates. Each of these
components of changes in the deficit may have—in theory—different ef-
fects on the real exchange rate. As noted, there is some evidence that the
difference in the effects of spending and deficits is empirically important.
Feldstein criticizes Evans for using unexpected changes (measured as
residuals from a vector autoregression) in his analysis, and for consider-
ing only current budget deficits rather than prospective future deficits.
While Feldstein is correct that, in theory, prospective future deficits are
important, the high autocorrelation of structural budget deficits as a
fraction of trend or potential GNP (used by both Feldstein and Evans)
reduces the empirical importance of the point. Unexpected increases in
the current structural deficit probably make fair proxies for near-future
structural deficits as well.
Even if it were necessary to use a measure of the deficit that directly
incorporates prospective future deficits, it would be important to control
for the components of the deficit in order to estimate a coefficient thatComment 405
has any chance of remaining stable over time and being subject to an un-
ambiguous interpretation. A. second piece of evidence, though, casts
doubt on the importance of expected future deficits in an equation for
the exchange rate: Evans found no evidence that changes in expected fu-
ture deficits have an independent effect on the exchange rate.
The evidence for the period since 1973, therefore, does not necessarily
support Feldstein's hypothesis. Furthermore, there is little reason to re-
strict ourselves to the period of flexible exchange rates to examine these
issues. The effects of government budget deficits (or, more precisely, the
effects of changes in government spending, tax receipts, etc.) on the real
exchange rate can be examined using data over much longer periods of
time and over a much larger cross-section of countries. The theories gen-
erally postulated, and outlined in Feldstein's article, about the effect of
budget deficits on the real exchange rate, do not refer specifically to a
regime of flexible nominal exchange rates. In particular, the postulated
effect of U.S. government budget deficits on real interest rates in the
United States is independent of the exchange rate system. Greater gov-
ernment borrowing to finance the deficit adds to demand on credit
markets—and in the absence of Ricardian equivalence, raises the real in-
terest rate—irrespective of the exchange rate system. Empirically, the
existing evidence on Ricardian equivalence, i.e., the evidence regarding
the effects of changes in the timing of taxes (holding fixed the path of
spending) on interest rates, is mixed. The existing evidence regarding
the effects of the timing of taxes on international interest rate differ-
entials is even weaker.
In the theory outlined by Feldstein, high U.S. budget deficits raise real
interest rates on dollar-denominated securities. These are imperfect sub-
stitutes for securities denominated in foreign currencies. So the interest
rate differential between dollar-denominated' assets and other assets
rises with the relative stock of dollar-denominated assets. I have no quar-
rel with these arguments in the absence of Ricardian equivalence, though'
it should be noted that a temporary budget deficit has a permanent
effect on the relative asset supplies, so that a subsequent reduction in the
deficit need not reduce the yield differential. The assumption of imper-
fect substitutability between assets denominated in different currencies
is a reasonable one, because the'real rates of return on these assets are
affected by inflation rates in each currency. Imperfect correlation of infla-
tion across countries gives different risk properties to assets denomi-
nated in different currencies, so a change in the net supply of dollar-
denominated assets should (in the absence of Ricardian equivalence)
raise the yield differential.
But, the theory continues, the increase in the yield differential raisesSTOCKMAN
the value of the dollar. As Feldstein puts it, "the dollar must rise by
enough so that its expected future fall just offsets the nominal yield dif-
ferential between dollar securities and foreign assets." Now, empirically,
it is difficult to believe that markets expected a major fall in the value of
the dollar when the dollar appreciated in this period. No evidence for
expected depreciation shows up in futures markets or forward markets
for currencies. But there are also theoretical problems with the argu-
ment. The increase in the yield differential, in this theory, reflects a
change in the terms on which the new stocks of assets will be willingly
held. The yield differential, therefore, does not provide new opportuni-
ties for arbitrage between securities or new incentives for capital flows.
In that sense, the differential in this theory is an equilibrium phenome-
non. The same risk premium embodied in the yield differential shows
up in the forward premium. The dollar may appreciate if the yield differ-
ential were. to rise, for some reason, above its equilibrium value. But that
is not what is stated in the theory, nor is it very plausible that substantial
yield differentials could exist very long on well-integrated international
financial markets (particularly between countries like Germany and the
United States), unless they reflect differences in risk premia, taxes, or
transactions costs. So even if higher budget deficits in the United States
lead to higher interest rates and a larger international yield differential,
this does not imply that the dollar appreciates.
Nor does the theory suggest that economists should restrict them-
selves to periods of flexible exchange rates to examine these issues. Ad-
ditional evidence can be obtained by examining longer periods of time,
for many countries, with various exchange rate systems. Only if the ex-
change rate system itself plays some role in the argument would econo-
mists want to limit themselves to one system or the other. That would be
the case if price levels were sticky, so that the real exchange rate moves
sluggishly in response to a deficit under pegged exchange rates (when
the entire change in the real exchange rate must come from a change in
price levels), while the real exchange rate can respond more rapidly to
deficits under flexible exchange rates (because the nominal exchange rate
can adjust). But, as I have argued elsewhere, the near-random-walk be-
havior of real (and nominal) exchange rates is inconsistent with models
that postulate sticky prices or other slowly adjusting state variables. So it
seems reasonable to expect that any effects of deficits on real exchange
rates would show up in the data under various exchange rate systems;
empirical studies need not be limited to the small samples of flexible ex-
change rates.
Additional evidence on the type of theory outlined by Feldstein canComment
also be obtained by examining its other implications. For example, if
high deficits in the United States lead to dollar appreciaton, that ap-
preciation should reduce the profitability of U.S. exporting firms and
import-competing firms, and raise the profitability of foreign firms ex-
porting to the United States or competing with U.S. exports in their
home market. These changes in profitability should be reflected in stock
market values for these firms. But the evidence indicates a zero correla-
tion, at all leads and lags, between (changes in) stOck prices or returns
and real exchange rates (see, for instance, Wasserfallen (1985). The evi-
dence from the stock market, therefore, does not support any theory
in which changesreal exchange rates are systematically related to
changes in profitability of foreign or domestic firms. The absence of any
systematic relationship could be explained by a model in which changes
in the real exchange rate reflect changes in equilibrium relative prices,
and in which the underlying economic disturbances are mixtures of
shocks to supply and to demand. In that case, profitability and relative
price are not systematically related, because positive demand distur-
bances raise the relative price and raise profitability while negative sup-
ply disturbances raise the relative price but may lower profitabffity. The
stock market evidence, then, would suggest that changes in real ex-
change rates are not caused by deficits but by disturbances to demands
and supplies for various goods, some of which may be due to changes in
government expenditure.
Cross-sectionally, differences in real exchange rates are closely related
to differences in real incomes. Countries with higher real incomes have
higher prices than those predicted by purchasing power parity, while
those with lower real incomes have lower prices. The evidence on changes
in real exchange rates over time should be consistent with the cross-
sectional evidence. That evidence could be usefully exploited in future
research to supplement time-series studies over longer periods of time
and across more countries than the study by Feldstein.
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Feldstein agreed with Stockman and Dornbusch on the importance of
looking at a broader group of countries. He stressed the significance of
long-term interest rate differentials for exchange rates. Certainly all rates
matter, but if interest rate differentials hold only at the short end, ex-
pected exchange rate changes will be very small. He would have pre-
ferred running nested hypothesis tests, but that was difficult with only
fourteen observations. In answer to Dornbusch, he commented that the
results on the effects of expected deficits are remarkably insensitive to
the choice of the horizon, whether three, five, or seven years.
Jacob Frenkel questioned the justification for constraining government
spending and taxes to enter only through the budget deficit. He pointed
out the importance of the timing of government spending. An increase
in current spending increases current demand and leads to a higher in-
terest rate, but an increase in future spending leads to a lower interest
rate now. He also expressed doubt that it was necessary to focus on the
interest rate differential as the mechanism through which government
spending and perhaps taxes affect the exchange rate.
Maurice Obstfeld commented that the interest rate differential and the
exchange rate are both endogenous; in response to different shocks they
may move to differing relative extents. He agreed with Feldstein that the
safe haven argument was inadequate, citing against it the strong correla-
tion of stock prices in the United States, Japan, and Germany. He also
argued that changes in government spending cause a transfer problem
that can move the exchange rate whether Ricardian equivalence holds or
not. Finally, he remarked that the recent fall in the dollar can be ex-
plained by changes in expectations of future budget deficits as well as in
monetary policy.
Robert Hall argued that the relation between the expected budget defi-
cit and the exchange rate should be a short-run one. In an extreme case,
over an infinite horizon the expected budget deficit has to be nearly
zero. He also suggested that the right version of "safe haven" is that the
United States became a safe haven for Latin-American investors.
The construction of the expected budget deficit vanbles was criticized
by Robert Barro. He recommended the use of Blanchard-like measures
that look over a longer horizon and include the variables that might
cause Ricardian equivalence to fail. He added that Ricardian equivalence
does not imply that the interest rate is not affected by a temporary
change in government spending, which is in practice correlated with the
budget deficit.Discussion409
OlivierBlanchard questioned the specification of the regressions with
the level of the exchange rate as the dependent variable. It is well known
that the exchange rate follows a random walk. The regressions should
therefore be run in first differences. He was puzzled, however, by the abil-
ity of the regressions to explain expected movements of the exchange rate.
Takatoshi Ito expressed doubt that the budget deficit affects the real
exchange rate. He had examined the behavior of the yen-dollar exchange
rate using four daily observations for 1500 days. He found that news
about the deficit had no effect on the exchange rate. Large changes in the
exchange rate are associated not with the deficit but with monetary
news. Ben Bemanke argued that an events study of the type done by Ito
might be a more promising direction of research than the type of regres-
sion in Feldstein's article, because the statistical expectations used by
Feldstein are inevitably poorer than those of the market.
Dornbusch found disturbing the insensitivity of Feldstein's results to
the length of horizon used to construct expected deficits. Surely the
turning points of expected deficits must differ depending on the hori-
zon; if those differences do not affect the empirical results, something
other than expected deficits may be producing the results.
Lawrence Summers said that the budget deficit story is oversold in this
article relative to alternative theories. In particular, the roles of tight
money and tax effects were not treated adequately. The monetary base
does not capture the tightness of monetary policy since it does not re-
flect velocity shocks. Tax incentives for investment affect the investment-
saving gap, hence the current account, and thus should affect the ex-
change rate. This effect may be smaller than that of the deficit, but must
be significant.
Martin Feldstein concluded the session by answering some of the
comments. He suggested that the small interest-rate effect on the ex-
change rate was probably due to downward bias due to simultaneity and
measurement error. In response to Robert Barro, he said that his results
are not sensitive to the method of construction of the budget deficit vari-
able. He did not want to work with first-differenced data since that was
likely to raise the noise/signal ratio. He agreed with Summers that the tax
effect should enter positively in a regression, but had found that the
effect is very small.
Si